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CHANGING COURSE IN THE ANTI-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGAL
MOVEMENT: FROM SAFETY TO SECURITY
MARGARET E. JOHNSON*
“[In the field of cybersecurity] [r]esilience is what allows a system to en-
dure security threats instead of critically failing.  A key to resilience is ac-
cepting the inevitability of threats and even limited failures in your
defenses.  It is about remaining operational with the understanding that
attacks and incidents happen on a continuous basis. . . .  [T]he objective
should be to prioritize resources and operations, protect key assets and
systems from attacks, and ultimately restore normal operations.”1
MARY
MARY2 met Todd in Florida.  Todd moved back to his home state ofWashington, D.C.; after a few months, he asked her to come and
join him.  Although she had no family or friends in D.C., Mary followed
Todd willingly.  She loved Todd and, flat broke and unsuccessful in find-
ing a job in Florida, hoped she would have better prospects up north.
After Mary moved in with Todd, however, he would not let her look
for a job.  He would not let her out of the house without his permission.  If
he thought she had done something that was against the many rules he
established for the household, he would hit her.  He told her that if she
ever left, he would find her.  She had no access to people or a telephone.
Mary’s necessary medicine for her long-term illness ran out, but Todd re-
fused to let her refill the prescription.  As the days went on, she got more
and more sick.  She knew she needed to get out and get to a hospital.
* Associate Professor, Director, Family Law Clinic, and Co-Director, Center
on Applied Feminism, University of Baltimore School of Law.  I appreciate the
comments I have received on this piece during the UB Law Faculty Research and
Development Series, the Law and Society Annual Meeting, the Converge!
Conference at the University of Miami Law School, and the Clinical Law Review
Writing Workshop at NYU Law School.  Special thanks to Dionne Koller, Michele
Gilman, Leigh Goodmark, Karen Czapanski, Donna Coker, Margaret Drew, Phyllis
Goldfarb, James Ptacek, Fred Brown, and Mae Quinn.  I especially thank Matt
Fraidin for his amazing assistance in helping me think through the ideas in this
Article.  I am grateful to my research assistants Lana Castor, Amy Lazas, Nicole
Whitaker, and Addie Crawford, and the University of Baltimore Law Library staff,
including David Matchen, Bijal Shah, and Adeen Postar.  I appreciate the support
of the University of Baltimore School of Law Summer Research Fellowship.  All
errors are of course mine.
1. P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT EVE-
RYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 36 (2014).
2. Mary is a fictional name, but her story is based on the experiences of a
client in my law clinic.
(145)
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One day when Todd left the home to run an errand, Mary quickly left
the house and asked a stranger to take her to a hospital.  The hospital
discharged Mary after treating her for a week.
Homeless, penniless, and afraid to return to Todd, Mary sought and
won a temporary protective order and with that successfully applied for a
thirty-day stay in an emergency shelter.  Two weeks later, the court issued a
one-year order that enjoined Todd from further abusing her, coming near
her, or contacting her.  Both orders gave Mary the power to call the police
to enforce them through arrest and criminal prosecution.3
While in the shelter, Mary received limited transportation vouchers.
The vouchers covered her travel from the distant shelter to the court, but
they did not cover her travel to the library where she wanted to apply for
jobs on the computer, to a nonprofit organization offering professional
attire she wanted for her job interviews, or to the job interviews she ob-
tained.  She accessed meager emergency grocery-store vouchers, with
which she purchased food and personal items not provided by the shelter,
such as toilet paper and tampons.  When Mary’s thirty-day emergency shel-
ter time came to an end, she could not access any long-term housing be-
cause it was in short supply.  She no longer had her transportation or food
vouchers.  With no money of her own, and feeling like she had no other
option, Mary reluctantly returned to Todd.
I. INTRODUCTION
Protection of women in the name of safety from domestic violence
has gone too far.  This Article argues that domestic violence law and prac-
tice overemphasize women’s short-term safety in ways that deprive women
3. But see, e.g., Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768
(2005) (holding that, under U.S. Constitution’s Due Process Clause, wife had no
constitutionally protected property interest in police enforcement of her re-
straining order against her husband).  Subsequent to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion, Ms. Lenahan (formerly Gonzales) brought a successful claim of human rights
violations under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
against the Castle Rock Police Department for failing to protect her and her chil-
dren, who were in fact killed by her estranged husband during the pendency of
her protective order, and human rights violations by the U.S. courts for failing to
remedy her situation. See Caroline Bettinger-Lopez, Introduction: Jessica Lenahan
(Gonzales) v. United States: Implementation, Litigation, and Mobilization Strategies, 21
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 207, 219–20 (2012).
2
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of dignity4 and agency,5 and, counterintuitively, make women less safe.6
Promoting a different paradigm, I argue women need security, both short-
term security that permits women to determine the best response to the
domestic violence, as well as options for long-term security—economic se-
curity, housing security, health security, and relationship security—that
will support their own resilience and allow them to grow, thrive, and direct
their lives after experiencing intimate partner abuse.
With federal and state domestic violence funding devoted largely to
law enforcement, and civil remedies emphasizing only physical violence
and primarily short-term remedies, women subjected to abuse get most of
our attention only in moments of crisis.  Emergency measures temporarily
4. Human dignity is the capacity of persons to be decision makers using “their
own conscience and conviction” regarding “the most fundamental questions
touching the meaning and value of their own lives.”  Margaret E. Johnson, Balanc-
ing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 546 (2010) [hereinafter Johnson, Balancing Liberty] (quoting
Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59
U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 426 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Dignity rec-
ognizes that women subjected to abuse have the right to decide how best to ad-
dress the intimate partner abuse without unwanted state intrusion or coercion. See
id. at 547.  For a discussion of the importance of dignity in domestic violence law
and policy, see id. at 519, 543–46.
5. Agency is the “‘capacity for self-definition and self-direction’ despite subor-
dination based on gender.”  Margaret E. Johnson, Redefining Harm, Reimagining
Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1107, 1114
n.24 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Redefining Harm] (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Sub-
ordination and Agency in Sexual Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT LAW 112–14 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004)).  It is
important that the domestic violence legal system and policy respect the agency of
women subjected to abuse, because research shows that women are the best
predictors of their risk of future abuse and are able to make decisions that best
address the abuse. See id. at 1124–29.
6. To discuss domestic violence, I use the terms domestic violence and inti-
mate partner abuse interchangeably to mean all the forms of abuse inflicted on an
intimate partner in an attempt to exert power and control over her.  I focus on
male-on-female abuse because it is the most prevalent form of intimate partner
abuse. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1110 n.4 (citing Joan B. Kelly R
& Michael P. Johnson, Differentiation Among Types of Intimate Partner Violence: Re-
search Update and Implications for Interventions, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 476, 481–82 (2008)).
Recognizing that men can be subjected to abuse as well, I often discuss persons
subjected to abuse.  And finally, I use the term subjected to abuse rather than
victim or survivor of domestic violence because the latter two terms may cause the
essentialization of a person by her experience of domestic violence. See id. at 1112
n.13.  As I discuss in this Article, domestic violence law and policy need to do a
better job of accounting for the whole person, and thus, I prefer the term woman
or person subjected to abuse.  For the same reason, I do not call the person perpe-
trating the acts of abuse a batterer as the term may reduce his personhood in ways
that may not resonate with the woman in relationship with him. See id.  I will use
the term victims when discussing how the criminal justice system views women sub-
jected to abuse.  And in discussing court cases, I use the terms designated by the
court system, such as petitioner, for the person subjected to abuse, and respondent
or defendant, for the person who committed the abuse.
3
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separate women from their partners who are abusing them, offering wo-
men a sometimes desperately-needed refuge.
But then what?  Like Mary, many women who experience domestic
violence find themselves homeless and jobless when the dust settles.  Like
Mary, they may have found temporary, emergency housing in a shelter for
victims of domestic violence.  They may have received crisis counseling.
But then, life marches on.
Persons subjected to intimate partner abuse may have been forced
from their homes because they lacked ownership rights and to avoid fu-
ture abuse.  They may have lost their jobs because injury or stress caused
them to miss work, or because their partner locked them in the house, or
because their partner’s on-the-job harassment frightened a boss or co-
workers.  In some instances, women may lose their children to foster care,
accused of “failing to protect” the children from the man who has endan-
gered them.7  Persons subjected to abuse may have lasting physical and
mental health damage from the intimate partner abuse to which they were
subjected.8
Displaced from home, employment, and education; exiled from their
community; and separated from their children, women who experience
abuse may be safe when the most conspicuous crisis passes.  Or the re-
sponses taken through physical separation may have made them less safe.
Either way, are they living their fully-actualized life?  Not yet.
And so the anti-domestic violence movement is at a choice moment.
It is time for a change.  It is time for the anti-domestic violence movement
to consider taking a critical look at the state and institutional response to
domestic violence and the current goal of safety, asking whether each es-
tablished response or new initiative is addressing the needs of persons sub-
jected to abuse in terms of their personal goals, resilience, agency, and
dignity.  The idea is for the response to be centered on the person’s expe-
rience of the abuse and not centered on the state or institution.  This shift
is one that needs to move from a primarily short-term safety focus to a
short and long-term security focus.  Security would include increasing ac-
cess to resources to increase economic, housing, health, and relationship
security of persons subjected to abuse.  Security would require that all new
legislative, policy, and funding initiatives address these areas.9
7. See Justine A. Dunlap, The “Pitiless Double Abuse” of Battered Mothers, 11 AM. U.
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 523, 525–28 (2003) (describing how New York’s child
welfare department found mothers neglectful of their children because mothers
were subjected to domestic violence).
8. See LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN:
A SURVIVOR-CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE
55–57 (2008) (discussing prevalence of posttraumatic stress disorder among per-
sons subjected to abuse).
9. The security paradigm’s requirement builds upon Donna Coker’s “material
resources test.” See Donna Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of
Economic Rights, 24 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 189 (2003) [hereinafter Coker, Eco-
nomic Rights].  Specifically, Coker states:
4
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This Article argues that the vast majority of current domestic violence
law and practice is oriented almost obsessively on short-term safety.  Do-
mestic violence policy has accordingly prioritized the narratives of physical
violence, crime, and danger over women’s experience of the broad-range
of abuse to which they are subjected, their experienced harms, and their
goals for greater satisfaction, including reduction or elimination of the
abuse.10
I argue that the criminal justice system has been the axis around
which much current anti-domestic violence policy has been formulated.
As the iconic manifestation of state power, domestic violence policy and
practices have focused on crimes, physical violence, and the pursuit of the
physical safety of community members.11  Examples of policies and prac-
tices focused on physical safety include laws mandating the arrest of sus-
pected perpetrators of domestic violence and laws forbidding prosecutors
from dismissing prosecutions—despite the fact that both approaches have
very mixed results in decreasing violence and sometimes increase it.12
Other examples include expansive funding for these criminal justice sys-
tem initiatives, thereby taking resources away from civil legal system re-
Every anti-domestic violence law, policy, funding priority, administrative
rule, you name it, should be subjected to a material resources test, which
asks: What is the impact, what is the effect of this law, policy, regulation,
et cetera, on the material resources of the women who are likely to come
in contact with this law, policy, regulation, et cetera?  Will this have an
impact that either primarily or secondarily gives women greater access to
material resources?  Because women’s circumstances differ in ways that
dramatically affect their access to material resources, further, I argue, the
standard for determining whether or not a given law, policy, et cetera,
passes muster under a material resources test should be the situation of
the women who are in the greatest need, those who are dramatically af-
fected by the inequalities of gender, race, and class.
Id.; see also Kameri Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies that Address the Relationship
Between Woman Abuse and Economic Resources, 29 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 109, 115
(2002) [hereinafter Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies] (“[M]ost authors who do
suggest policy implications or changes [for women subjected to intimate partner
abuse] typically focus on short-term solutions (helping women through the crisis)
rather than obtaining long-term economic security.  Tragically, such a narrow fo-
cus is prohibitive of effective programs and interventions being implemented.  Fur-
thermore, it can be predicted that women will find it hard to succeed within the
limits of these incomplete and inadequate policies and programs . . . .”).
10. In addition, as Beth Richie recently commented, the
Emerging feminist analysis [of the domestic violence movement] did not
include race and class . . . [as the] white women ha[d] the power to de-
fine which problems are real.  And from those definitions came very nar-
row definitions of who is entitled to protection, . . . more married you are,
the more American, the more legal, the more temporarily poor, the
fewer felony convictions the more you will be entitled to the attention
and resources of this movement.  And these very narrow definitions of
the problem aligned with state interest.
Beth Richie, Keynote Address at University of Miami Law School Converge! Con-
ference (Feb. 7, 2014) (notes from conference on file with author).
11. See infra notes 52–119 and accompanying text.
12. See id.
5
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sponses and grassroots organizations that provide necessary short and
long-term responses to domestic violence;13 a civil legal system that priori-
tizes physical abuse and crimes, thereby failing to remedy the full range of
abuse that society has an interest in eradicating;14 not enough funding for
emergency shelters and very little funding for longer-term housing,15 de-
spite the importance of housing in decreasing violence and stabilizing the
life of a person subjected to abuse;16 and not enough funding or support
responses to increase the economic, housing, health, and relationship se-
curity of persons subjected to domestic violence.17  In addition, the re-
sponse has been focused on short-term assistance, such as arrests,
prosecutions, incarcerations, short-term civil protection orders, and emer-
gency shelters, aimed at the immediate safety risk with far less attention to
the longer-term.18
The negative consequences of the safety paradigm include the inabil-
ity of persons subjected to abuse to be heard in the legal system because
they do not experience severe enough violence,19 because what they want
is not deemed “safe” by the institutions and the state from which they may
be seeking assistance,20 and because they have not sought assistance but
are coerced or ordered to receive assistance to be “safe,” as deemed by the
institutions and the state.21  Being safe and free from violent harm is im-
portant.  Yet there is an important difference between the woman sub-
jected to abuse choosing to employ actions to be safe and free of violent
harm and the state requiring the woman to physically separate from her
abusive partner.  In addition, there is an important difference between the
13. See id.; see also Coker, Economic Rights, supra note 9, at 188.
14. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131–38. R
15. See Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property
Rights, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1, 40–43 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Home].
16. See id. at 11–17.
17. See infra notes 52–119 and accompanying text.
18. See Erika A. Sussman, The Civil Protection Order as a Tool for Economic Justice,
ADVOC. Q., 2006 Issue 3, at 1 (citing to legislative history for state civil protection
order statutes and showing purpose is to promote safety).
19. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1145–48. R
20. See Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the Case
but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 225–34 (2008) (dis-
cussing courts’ denials of petitioners’ motions to vacate civil protection orders be-
cause it would not be safe); Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders:
Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 53 (2007) (discussing judges’ denials of petitioners’ mo-
tions to vacate civil protection orders).
21. See JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING PRIVACY 42 (2009) (discussing state-ordered de facto
divorce through no contact orders); Kimberly D. Bailey, It’s Complicated: Privacy and
Domestic Violence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1777, 1792–94 (2013) (discussing mandatory
state policies); Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 570–74; G. Kristian Mic-
cio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the Conservatization of the
Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 296–98 (2005) (discussing state
coercion of women subjected to abuse through mandatory criminal justice system
interventions).
6
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many ways that she may act in order to create safety for herself—such as
having her own finances, or continuing the relationship but eradicating
the abuse—and the almost one-size-fits-all way in which the state says she
should act to create safety—physically separating from her partner.  The
state and institutions too often use physical separation reflexively in ways
that are not responsive to the situation of a woman who is experiencing or
has experienced abuse.  As a result, a woman’s own agency and dignity can
be undermined in pursuit of what is deemed safe by others.  The harm of
this undermining may be greater than the harm that the safety measures
would address.  These institutional and state responses can cause signifi-
cant negative consequences as shown by the research that says that women
subjected to abuse are the best predictors of violence,22 that non-physical
violence is more damaging to women subjected to abuse than the physical
violence,23 and that the most effective response to help women subjected
to abuse is personalized.  A personalized response would ensure that their
goals are listened to and that there are many options from which they can
evaluate and choose as opposed to having decisions made for them.24
Moreover, the safety paradigm reinforces the problematic victim para-
digm.25  This construction of safety is problematic for several reasons.  It
reinforces gender stereotypes of helpless women who stay with abusers be-
cause they cannot think rationally and take actions to protect them-
selves.26  The safety paradigm also constructs women’s worlds as being
22. See Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 558–60. R
23. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1113 n.20 (stating that wo- R
men identified “threats and verbal abuse as more devastating than the physical”
(quoting ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 66
(2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources,
and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1017–20 (2000) [hereinafter
Coker, Shifting Power] (“It is a cruel trap when the state’s legal interventions rest on
the presumption that women who are ‘serious’ about ending domestic violence
will leave their partner while, at the same time, reducing dramatically the availabil-
ity of public assistance that makes leaving somewhat possible. . . .  The second
problem with equating separation with safety is that legal actors frequently believe
a corollary presumption: women’s use and full cooperation with legal remedies
increases their safety. . . .  The third problem with equating separation with safety
is that frequently the laws and services based on a separation premise devalue wo-
men’s connections with their partner and their investment in building family.”
(footnotes omitted)); Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 578–80. R
25. See Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique of “The” Feminist Critique of Pornogra-
phy, 79 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1151–52 (1993).
26. One reason offered for this framing is that it is rooted in Dr. Lenore
Walker’s work on learned helplessness and battered women’s syndrome, that wo-
men subjected to abuse are coerced into passivity and non-action. See LEIGH GOOD-
MARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 57–61
(2013); Kohn, supra note 20, at 206–09.  Another reason, I argue, is that this con-
struction of women as victims is much broader than originating in domestic vio-
lence theory and is rooted in gender oppression writ large.  For instance, such a
construction of women as victims is seen in such early writings as Blackstone’s com-
mentaries discussing coverture and women’s necessary loss of legal identity upon
marriage. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (“By marriage, the hus-
7
Johnson: Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: Fro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 8  5-MAR-15 8:45
152 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 145
filled with dangers and havens—the dangers are identified and removed
by the state or institutions, while the havens are identified and provided by
the state or institutions.  Because the state and institutions construct the
“danger” as physical violence, laws and funding streams prioritize this dan-
ger as the “problem.”  This leaves fewer resources for the broader range of
intimate partner abuse.  Relying on the safety construct, lawmakers funnel
a large percentage of public funds into the criminal justice system in re-
sponse to domestic violence.27  The preference for criminal justice mea-
sures contributes to long-standing systemic issues plaguing persons
subjected to intimate abuse.  The issue is illustrated in the housing context
where, even though domestic violence is the leading cause of family home-
lessness, a relatively small percentage of public funds is spent on housing
for persons subjected to abuse.28  Despite research that shows women are
best able to predict their own risk, the state and institutions construct a
“haven” based on their view of the problem, thereby prioritizing their
ideas of how best to save women from the violence, while not prioritizing
women’s own perception of what is “safe” for themselves today, tomorrow,
and in the future.  As a result, the state and institution construction of
danger and havens does not always effectuate even short-term safety be-
cause it misdiagnoses the problem and generates inappropriate options.
The state and institutional construction of safety deters the creation of
laws and funding that support women’s security—their resiliency, agency,
and dignity—over the long-term, not just in the short-term.
This Article argues that the safety paradigm misses the forest for the
trees.  Arguing for a reorientation toward “security,” this Article suggests
that the current “safety paradigm” is harmful to women and fails even to
achieve its stated objective of ensuring women’s safety.  A broadened, real-
istic vision of women’s strengths and needs can provide women with the
support, tools, and resources needed to fully repair their lives from the
harm inflicted in abusive relationships.  Measures designed to promote se-
curity recognize women’s interests in sustained growth, health, and
agency.  Reorienting societal responses toward ensuring women’s health,
housing, and economic viability can provide the stability women need to
make choices consistent with their own definitions of dignity and self-
worth while, not coincidentally, keeping them safer in the long run.  The
reframing of the domestic violence movement from the predominant goal
of safety to security will help reshape a legal system that can be more re-
band and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of
the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and con-
solidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover she
performs every thing . . . .”).
27. See infra notes 52–119 and accompanying text.
28. See Facts on Homelessness, Housing, & Violence Against Women, NAT’L L. CTR.
ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, available at http://www.nlchp.org/documents/DV_
Fact_Sheet.
8
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sponsive to the needs and harms of persons subjected to abuse, such as
Mary, while also addressing domestic violence more effectively.
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II examines the prevailing
short-term safety paradigm goal of anti-domestic violence legal and fund-
ing systems.  This Part also analyzes the different policies and laws used to
effectuate the safety paradigm, such as the criminal justice system itself,
mandatory arrest and prosecution policies, mandatory no contact orders,
civil protection orders (CPO) mandating physical separation, domestic vi-
olence shelter mandated separation, lethality assessment programs, and
the lack of robust long-term options for housing, employment, and finan-
cial stability.  This Part concludes by discussing how these policies affect
women subjected to abuse as well the epidemic of domestic violence
generally.
In Part III, I propose that security, not safety, serve as the philosophi-
cal driving force behind domestic violence law and practice.  I argue that
law, funding, policy, and practice should promote long-term assistance in-
tended to support resilience, agency, and dignity.  Such a response would
include long-term housing options, including the ability to be within a
supportive community; long-term employment or other income-genera-
tion options, with long-term employment supports such as career counsel-
ing, education, quality child care, and available transportation; increased
income and asset-building opportunities without the barriers of discrimi-
nation; access to public assistance; long-term physical and mental health
care, preventative, and treatment options; long-term civil protective and
other court orders that provide injunctive, family, housing, and economic
remedies; and the development of enhanced social capital and community
connection for persons subjected to abuse.  An approach oriented toward
long-term measures, such as these, would provide the security and stability
women need to determine how best to address the violence in their
relationships.
Finally, in Part IV, I offer examples of how the domestic violence legal
and funding systems could do more to address security.  For example, the
legal and funding systems could address all forms of intimate partner
abuse, end mandatory responses to domestic violence, address barriers to
employment and access to secure and livable wages, address coerced debt,
expand opportunities for asset building, increase housing options, support
social capital development through time banking, and provide monetary
damages for domestic violence.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: SAFETY PARADIGM
To understand the prevailing safety paradigm, it is important to un-
derstand what domestic violence is and how our current laws and policies
address domestic violence.
9
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A. Domestic Violence
Research has demonstrated that domestic violence, or “intimate part-
ner abuse,” can take a wide range of forms, in addition to physical aggres-
sion by one partner against another.  According to social work professor
Judy Postmus, for example, intimate partner violence is:
[A] pattern of behavior in a relationship by which the batterer
attempts to control his victim through a variety of tactics.  These
tactics may include fear and intimidation, physical and/or sexual
abuse, psychological and emotional abuse, destruction of prop-
erty and pets, isolation and imprisonment, economic abuse, and
rigid expectations of sex roles.29
This pattern of behavior has been called “[c]oercive [c]ontrolling
[v]iolence”30 or “coercive control.”31  Such abuse may involve one of these
tactics alone, such as physical abuse, or employ several or all tactics.32  As
psychologists Mary Ann Dutton and Lisa Goodman have documented in
their studies, there are nine areas of coercive control used by abusers on
their partners: “personal activities/appearance,” “support/social life/fam-
ily,” “household,” “work/economic/resources,” “health,” “intimate rela-
tionship,” “legal,” “immigration,” and “children.”33  Of the various forms
of domestic violence, women subjected to intimate partner abuse “fre-
quently describe the threats and verbal abuse as more devastating than the
physical.”34  Further, research shows that psychological abuse often can
develop into physical abuse.35
Focusing on economic abuse, law professor Dana Harrington Conner
catalogues three forms: (1) targeting women of limited economic means,
in poverty, in vulnerable situations because of immigration status, limited
English proficiency, connection to their community, or limited social capi-
tal; (2) creating financial dependence by precluding access to money and
29. Judy L. Postmus, Analysis of the Family Violence Option: A Strengths Perspective,
15 AFFILIA 244, 244–45 (2000) (citations omitted).
30. Kelly & Johnson, supra note 6, at 481.
31. EVAN STARK, COERCIVE CONTROL: THE ENTRAPMENT OF WOMEN IN PER-
SONAL LIFE 12–13 (2007).
32. See Kelly & Johnson, supra note 6, at 481 (“Abusers do not necessarily use
all of these tactics, but they do use a combination of the ones that they feel are
most likely to work for them.  Because these nonviolent control tactics may be
effective without the use of violence (especially if there has been a history of vio-
lence in the past), Coercive Controlling Violence does not necessarily manifest
itself in high levels of violence.”).
33. Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743, 747 (2005).
34. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 66
(2000); see also EVE SCHLESINGER BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM RESPONSE 25 (3d ed. 2002); LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN 34 (2d ed. 2000).
35. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1113 (citing Kelly & John- R
son, supra note 6, at 483).
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property resources, sabotaging one’s economic stability and property own-
ership, precluding or sabotaging employment and education opportuni-
ties, and/or isolating from people; and (3) limiting access to economic
resources, destroying whatever economic resources she may have, and
damaging social capital.36  The coercion around work and finances is a
significant form of intimate partner abuse because it is so powerful.  Such
coercion can include “[m]aking or attempting to make a person finan-
cially dependent, e.g., maintaining total control over financial resources,
withholding access to money, forbidding attendance at school or employ-
ment.”37  Further tactics include acts such as “sabotag[ing] a woman’s ef-
forts to find a job or attend a job training . . . [by] turning off her alarm
clock so she will be late for work, cutting off her hair to cause her great
embarrassment, inflicting visible injuries or creating conflicts before cru-
cial events, and hiding or destroying her books, homework, or clothing.”38
Even if the woman becomes successfully employed, the abuse may con-
tinue with the intimate partner “disrupting her transportation or childcare
arrangements or harassing her at work.”39
As discussed above, domestic violence can be perpetrated in multiple
ways, with varying tactics to exert coercive control, beyond simply physical
violence.
B. The Safety Paradigm
The current safety paradigm of anti-domestic violence law and policy
is the result of responses to the state’s initial absence of a response to
domestic violence.  Domestic violence advocacy in the 1960s was a grass-
roots movement, focused on all forms of abuse, and on women’s empow-
erment, agency, and dignity as a way to address the abuse.40  Women who
experienced abuse were provided counseling focused primarily on con-
sciousness-raising about domestic violence as a form of gender oppres-
sion.41  Most of the efforts were expended to create a network of grass-
roots shelters to which women could escape from abusive relationships.42
In the 1970s and 1980s, feminists focused on the void of state re-
sponses to the continued epidemic levels of abuse and lobbied the state
36. See Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domes-
tic Abuse, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 357–69 (2014).
37. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1120 (alteration in original) R
(quoting What is Domestic Violence?, WOMENSLAW.ORG, http://www.womenslaw.org/
simple.php?sitemap_id=39) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Postmus, supra note 29, at 246.
39. Id.
40. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 196 (stating that general social activism of
1960s included activism against women’s subordination in society, including
through domestic violence).
41. See SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND
STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 62–68 (1982).
42. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 196.
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for formal laws and policies to address intimate partner violence.43  That
lobbying focused on domestic violence as physical violence and especially
criminal acts.44  Finding that the state’s response was nonetheless still
often lacking, advocates successfully lobbied for new laws to remove state
actors’ discretion by mandating the arrest and prosecution of suspected
batterers.45  States enacted civil protection order laws, permitting women
to seek protection primarily from physical abuse that would constitute a
crime regardless of the outcome of criminal proceedings against a bat-
terer.46  Through this engagement of the state, philosophical and funding
priorities changed from women’s own empowerment responses address-
ing broad forms of intimate partner abuse to the state and other outsiders’
responses addressing primarily criminal physical abuse.  In 1994, the Vio-
lence Against Women Act47 (VAWA) was enacted, and 1.6 billion dollars48
were allocated to support legal, court, and community-based responses to
domestic violence, which were focused on combatting physical violence
and used short-term physical separation as the remedy.49
As a result of these efforts, there are police who will now arrest per-
sons for abusing their partner, there are prosecutors who will finally prose-
cute these crimes, there are civil protection order laws, and there is a
developed coordinated response of criminal and civil courts dedicated to
domestic violence.50  There are also many services developed to respond
to domestic violence, including civil legal services for civil protective or-
ders, emergency shelters, counseling, transitional housing, and more.51
43. See id. at 196–97.
44. Cf. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 4–5 (“[C]riminal justice case
processing requirements may have directly defined the parameters of permissible
contact by criminalizing certain violent conduct, while tacitly condoning harass-
ment or other strategies of coercive control, actions that in practice rarely result in
arrest or prosecution.”).
45. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 196–97, 199; Miccio, supra note 21, at 278.
46. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 196–97.
47. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§§ 40001–40703, 108 Stat. 1902.
48. See Robert F. Friedman, Note, Protecting Victims from Themselves, but Not Nec-
essarily from Abusers: Issuing a No-Contact Order over the Objection of the Victim-Spouse, 19
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235, 239 (2010) (citing Julie Goldscheid, United States v.
Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil Rights
Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 113 (2000)).
49. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 200 (“Most individuals in the justice system
hope to protect battered women from further violence by seeking to remove them
from abusive relationships.”).  VAWA also contained a civil rights provision for per-
sons subjected to abuse that permitted them to get injunctive and declaratory re-
lief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for crimes of violence motivated
by gender. See Goldscheid, supra, at 113–15.  This provision was later struck down
by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000).
50. See generally Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
3 (1999).
51. See GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 25–28. R
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These developments have occurred in large part due to the success of the
anti-domestic violence movement and its alliance with the state, including
the large amounts of government funding that support the government-
designed response and, to a much lesser extent, the non-legal response.
Many of these developments constitute the safety paradigm.
C. The Safety Paradigm in Contemporary Law, Policy, and Practice
The safety paradigm has four components.  First, it is focused on pri-
marily physical and sexual violence as domestic violence rather than also
looking at psychological, emotional, and economic abuse and coercive
control.52  Second, its goal is principally to address the immediate crisis
and defuse the situation through short-term remedies.  Third, its goal is to
ensure that the government ends future physical and sexual violence
through the physical separation of the parties.53  Fourth, it provides that
the state, and not the person subjected to abuse, is the decision maker as
to how best to address the domestic violence.54  There are many examples
of the safety paradigm in the current domestic violence law and funding
schemes.
The criminal justice system demonstrates a safety paradigm as it is
generally only concerned with physical violence, injuries caused by physi-
cal violence, and remedies ensuring physical separation through arrest,
criminal prosecution, incarceration, fines, criminal stay away orders, and
batterers intervention programs.55  Moreover, the state is the decision
maker as to the remedy pursued and not the person subjected to abuse.56
52. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 4–5 (“[C]riminal codes are typi-
cally rather blunt instruments, defining violence as individual acts, usually a physical
assault or threat of physical harm intended to cause physical harm.”).
53. See id. at 5 (explaining criminal justice system has “implicit requirement
for the identification of a crime with a defined victim and offender in the context
of a recognized applicable criminal statute”); JENNIFER G. LONG ET AL., AEQUITAS,
MODEL POLICY FOR PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES ON IMPOSING, MODIFYING AND LIFTING
CRIMINAL NO CONTACT ORDERS 2 (2010), available at http://www.aequitasresource
.org/model_policy.pdf (stating that goals of criminal justice system regarding do-
mestic violence are “to seek justice, protect the victim and the community, hold
the offender accountable for his crimes, prevent and deter future crime, and reha-
bilitate the abuser”).
54. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 4 (discussing ascendancy of crimi-
nal justice system domestic violence response: “the United States currently has a
propensity to use coercive legal powers to ‘solve’ social problems”).
55. It should be noted that prosecutors’ offices do staff victim advocates who
work with the persons subjected to abuse and address some short-term needs such
as housing and food.  Primarily, these victim advocates are in place to help obtain
the cooperation of the person who was subjected to abuse in the prosecution of
the abuse.  In other words, these services are offered to fulfill the criminal justice
system’s goals and not any incompatible goals of the person subjected to abuse. See
generally Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims Be Forced to
Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 383,
398–406 (2001); Kohn, supra note 20.
56. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 4, 126–28.
13
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One clear example of this point is the mandatory arrest laws.  As of De-
cember 2011, twenty-two states plus Washington, D.C. had mandatory ar-
rest laws that required the responding police officer to arrest at least the
primary aggressor if an assault had occurred.57  This requirement exists
even if the person subjected to abuse opposes or does not request the
arrest.  In addition, thirty-three states had mandatory arrest laws that re-
quired a police officer to arrest a respondent who violated a civil protec-
tion order.58  Six states preferred arrest laws “encouraging” police officers
to make arrests if an assault occurred.59  Such laws permit police officers
discretion in deciding whether to arrest, including some consideration of
the crime victim’s opinion on the arrest.60
“No-drop” prosecution policies provide another example of the state
acting as the sole decision maker as to the remedy pursued.61  Many states
have developed mandatory prosecution, or no-drop prosecution policies,
as a response to the early outcry by domestic violence advocates that the
state was not seriously addressing domestic violence.62  In addition to the
police’s failure to arrest for domestic violence, advocates cited the prose-
cutors’ failure to proceed with prosecutions of those who were in fact ar-
rested.  No-drop prosecution policies may be contained in legislation or
issued by state attorney general offices and are encouraged and financially
supported by federal law.63  Under “hard” no-drop policies, neither prose-
cutors nor the person subjected to abuse have any discretion as to whether
a case supported by evidence will go forward.  Prosecutors must prosecute
the case even when the crime victim, the person subjected to abuse, re-
quests that the case be dismissed and/or refuses to cooperate with the
prosecutor by being interviewed or testifying at trial.64  “Soft” no-drop
prosecution policies permit prosecutors to dismiss criminal cases based on
57. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, RE-




60. See Amy M. Zelcer, Note, Battling Domestic Violence: Replacing Mandatory Ar-
rest Laws with a Trifecta of Preferential Arrest, Officer Education, and Batterer Treatment
Programs, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 541, 554–55 (2014).
61. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domes-
tic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1853 (1996).
62. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 194–95 (“[Sixty-six percent] of a
sample of local prosecutors in jurisdictions with populations of over 250,000 had
no-drop policies.”); see also Miccio, supra note 21, at 265.
63. See Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Vio-
lence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853,
863–65 (1994) (citing state legislation, state attorney generals’ policies, and the
Federal Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption and Family Services Act of
1992).  Specifically, Corsilles discusses section 10415 of the Act, which provides
state grants for their no-drop prosecution policies. See id. at 864; see also Federal
Child Abuse, Domestic Violence, Adoption and Family Services Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-295, 106 Stat. 187.
64. See Miccio, supra note 21, at 266.
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the victim’s desires if the victim has physically separated from the defen-
dant.65  One stated justification for a hard no-drop policy is victim safety.
Such safety is intended to result from the prosecution and eventual incar-
ceration, criminal stay away orders, or rehabilitation training of defend-
ants that will in turn reduce future battering through separation,
stigmatizing the relationship, and notifying the victim and defendant that
the victim cannot be controlled by the defendant.  Moreover, the no-drop
policy informs victims who desire to stay with the defendant that their
wishes are the result of coercion and not agency.66
Criminal no contact orders are another example of the safety para-
digm.  Criminal no contact orders are instituted almost routinely during
the prosecution of a domestic violence crime as part of pretrial release
and are often included as part of the sentence.67  These stay away orders
are ordered even against the will of the person subjected to abuse.68
Civil protection order laws permit persons subjected to abuse to peti-
tion a civil court for various forms of injunctive relief, such as no further
abuse, stay away, no contact, and vacate the home orders; family-based
relief, such as a temporary child custody and support order; and other
relief, such as domestic violence counseling and control over some forms
of personal property.69  All United States jurisdictions permit a petition
for a protective order to be based upon a criminal or violent act between
intimate cohabitating partners.70  CPOs contain both safety and security
elements, but the predominant elements are the safety elements.  Only
one-third of all jurisdictions recognize or remedy harms from emotional
and economic abuse, and only one-third of the jurisdictions recognize and
provide a remedy for coercive control.71  Further, only thirty-seven CPO
laws provide a catch-all provision that could provide an economic remedy
beyond child or spousal support to include compensatory and punitive
damages.72  On the other hand, all CPOs contain directives specifically
based on the physical separation safety paradigm and last for a short time,
usually one year in length.73  In some jurisdictions, the petitioners’ choice
65. See Friedman, supra note 48, at 242 (citing BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note R
34, at 194).
66. See id. at 242–43.
67. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 235; Friedman, supra note 48, at R
246–47.
68. See Friedman, supra note 48, at 247.
69. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131; Catherine F. Klein & R
Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910–1031 (1993).
70. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131–32; Klein & Orloff, R
supra note 69, at 848–58. R
71. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1133–38. R
72. New Jersey has provided compensatory and punitive damages under its
catch-all provision. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 69, at 912 n.695.
73. Jurisdictions vary on the duration of CPOs: three months (two states); six
months (five states); one year (twenty-two states); eighteen months to two years
(nine states); three to five years (eight states); and a few with permanent protective
15
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of how best to address the abuse is severely limited, in that she may not
request an injunction against further abuse without also requesting a stay
away and no contact order.74  Even when the governing statute does not
mandate physical separation, courts deciding CPO matters have required
it even against the will of the petitioner, the person subjected to abuse
requesting the CPO.  In certain jurisdictions, if the petitioner chooses to
vacate her CPO after it is issued, the court will not permit her to do so.75
One court in New Jersey stated that it would not vacate the order because
its duty was to protect the victim of domestic violence.76  The cycle of vio-
lence theory—that is related to battered women’s syndrome—states that
after violent incidents, the abusive partner apologizes and creates a “hon-
eymoon”-like atmosphere in the relationship, thus, the women subjected
to abuse are lulled into a false sense of security that the violence is over.77
Courts refusing to vacate CPOs override women’s wishes, relying on the
cycle of violence to justify the courts’ decisions.78  This reliance exists de-
spite the fact that researchers have questioned the theory’s validity and
universal applicability.79
Similarly, crime victim compensation fund laws may discourage pay-
ment to a person subjected to abuse if she has not physically separated
from or continues to reside with the person who committed the abuse.
For instance, under West Virginia law, no payment of monies may be
made to a person subjected to abuse who chooses to maintain her home
with her partner who was abusive because the monies should not serve to
support the offender or cause him unjust enrichment.80  Accordingly, the
person subjected to abuse who chooses to maintain her relationship with
the person who had abused her could be denied funds to support her
housing and daily living expenses that she would otherwise be able to col-
lect if she were physically separated from her partner.
Domestic violence shelters also illustrate aspects of the safety para-
digm.  First, many shelters make decisions for residents as to how they
spend their time in the shelter and require certain behaviors to gain access
to the shelter.  For instance, many shelters require residents to undergo
orders. See Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1046–50 (2014).
74. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 45 n.198 (citing Sally F. Goldfarb,
Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse
Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1504 n.110 (2008)) (dis-
cussing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-28.1, which establishes that no protection order can
be granted that would permit respondent to share premises with petitioner). See
generally Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using the Stages of Change Model to
Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 333 (2011).
75. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 225–26; Kuennen, supra note 20, at 45–46.
76. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 714 A.2d 986, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1998).
77. See GOODMARK, supra note 26, at 31–33.
78. See id. at 33.
79. See id. at 32–33.
80. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2A-26 (West 2012).
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therapy and substance abuse counseling, abide by bureaucratic rules, ap-
ply for public benefits, and conform their parenting to certain guidelines
as a condition of remaining in the shelter.81  These requirements are dic-
tated in large part by the funding they receive.  Second, many domestic
violence shelters require separation by locating in confidential locations to
prevent women’s partners from being able to find them.82  Many shelters
also require that the woman subjected to abuse cease all contact with the
partner who had been abusive.83  Third, most shelters exclude men or
transgendered women, especially those who are not postoperative, on the
assumption that men and transgendered women are potential perpetra-
tors of abuse.84
Many of the programs described above are funded by the Violence
Against Women Act and other federal laws.  The largest category of fed-
eral appropriations to combat domestic violence was granted to the crimi-
nal justice system.  A large category of these criminal justice system funds
go towards arrest and prosecution policies, such as mandatory arrest and
no drop prosecution policies.85  The federal government allocated a total
of $944 million to the criminal justice system response to domestic vio-
lence, including the Services, Training, Officers, Prosecutors (STOP) pro-
gram, the Arrest Policies Program, and VOCA grant programs.86  The
2012 funding for the STOP grants was $189 million.87  The funding is
used to establish protocols and special units in prosecutors’ offices and law
enforcement agencies.  The Grants to Encourage Arrests (Arrests Policies
Program) was granted $50 million in 2012.88  These grants are given to
support “criminal justice policies, practices and procedures regarding ar-
rest and protection order laws to enhance victim safety and ensure of-
fender accountability.”89  A significant amount of the federal
appropriations go to crime victims funds that provide financial assistance
to persons subjected to physical domestic violence or other domestic vio-
lence crimes.  The Victims of Crime Act Fund received $705 million in
2012.90  While the funds may reimburse a person subjected to abuse for
81. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 44. R
82. See id. at 38 (citing GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 102). R
83. See id. at 44.
84. See Leigh Goodmark, Transgender People, Intimate Partner Abuse, and the Le-
gal System, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 51, 67–71 (2013). See generally Melody M.
Crick, Comment, Access Denied: The Problem of Abused Men in Washington, 27 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1035 (2004).
85. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2002) (noting VAWA funding supports no-drop policies).
86. See CAMPAIGN FOR FUNDING TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & SEXUAL AS-
SAULT, FY 2013 APPROPRIATIONS BRIEFING BOOK 8, 18, 39 (Mar. 2012) [hereinafter
2013 APPROPRIATIONS BRIEFING BOOK], available at http://nnedv.org/downloads/
Policy/FY_13_Briefing_Book.pdf.
87. See id. at 8.
88. See id. at 18.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 39.
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certain types of relief necessary because of the domestic violence—such as
physical and mental health treatment—a person who is subjected to solely
psychological, emotional, or economic abuse would not qualify because a
potential recipient needs to prove that she was subjected to a crime.91
Certain short-term responses to domestic violence are also funded at
a high level.  The federal government allocated $173.7 million to predomi-
nately short-term safety and security initiatives.92  Under the Family Vio-
lence Prevention and Services Act, the federal government appropriated
$129.5 million in 2012 for domestic violence shelters, counseling, and hot-
line services.93  The federal government granted $3.2 million for the Na-
tional Domestic Violence Hotline in 2012.94  It granted $41 million in civil
legal assistance, which covered short and long-term responses to domestic
violence.95  If these short-term services were provided to effectuate goals
that were not those of the person subjected to abuse, they would qualify as
safety paradigm services under this Article’s working definition of safety.
The federal government appropriated much less money, $31.4 mil-
lion, for long-term solutions to domestic violence.  The following are the
monies spent for such security items as economic, housing, health, and
relationship security.  For instance, in 2012, the federal government
granted $25 million in transitional housing monies.96  The Transitional
Housing Assistance Grants provide monies to persons subjected to abuse
for longer-term housing costs, including rent and utilities, as well as other
support services, like transportation and childcare; and the grants provide
monies to service providers managing the transitional housing pro-
grams.97  The government also appropriated $5.4 million in grants to the
Domestic Violence Prevention Enhancement and Leadership Through Al-
liances (DELTA) program.98  DELTA “supports statewide projects to inte-
grate primary prevention principles and practices into local coordinated
community responses that address and reduce the incidence of intimate
partner violence,” such as peer education for men about families and rela-
tionships.99  The federal government granted $1 million in 2012 for the
National Resources Center on Workplace Responses to Assist Victims of
Domestic and Sexual Violence.100
91. See Jeffrey A. Parness et al., Monetary Recoveries for State Crime Victims, 58
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 819, 842–50 (2010).
92. See 2013 APPROPRIATIONS BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 86, at 18, 29, 31.
93. See id. at 29.
94. See id. at 32.
95. See id. at 19.
96. See id. at 20.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 36.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 26.
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The safety paradigm is equally prominent in state legislation.101  In
the 2012 legislative sessions, the fifty states and the District of Columbia
passed 249 laws regarding domestic violence.  Twenty-six states passed a
total of ninety-seven criminal laws regarding domestic violence that rein-
forced the safety paradigm.102  Nineteen jurisdictions passed thirty-nine
family law provisions regarding custody and child welfare issues that ad-
dressed both the safety paradigm as well as relationship security.  Eighteen
jurisdictions passed thirty-eight laws instituting procedures for orders of
protection, which blended features of the safety and security paradigms,
and addressed issues such as confidentiality, procedure, firearm removal,
and actionable abuse.  Finally, three jurisdictions passed four laws address-
ing treatment of offenders, exhibiting elements both of the safety and re-
lationship security paradigms.103  Only thirteen jurisdictions addressed
purely security issues, such as programs and policies relating to teen dat-
ing violence,104 unemployment insurance for persons subjected to
abuse,105 in-state tuition and education waivers for persons subjected to
abuse and their children,106 expanded housing options,107 expanding ac-
cess to crime victims compensation fund monies,108 confidentiality protec-
tion,109 and studies examining the treatment and prevention of domestic
101. For instance, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges
stated that “the 2012 legislative session [across all states] reflects steadfast focus on
enhanced victim safety, increased perpetrator accountability, and ambitious preven-
tion efforts.” See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY VIO-
LENCE: LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 4, available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/
files/legislative_update_18.pdf (emphasis added).
102. See id. at 10–17 (tallying numbers of states that have enacted domestic
violence legislation).
103. See id. at 10–13 (showing Florida, Kansas, and West Virginia have passed
“prevention and treatment” legislation in addition to criminal measures).
104. See id. at 14–17 (noting Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon
passed “adolescent partner violence” legislation).
105. See id. at 59–60.  In Maryland, new legislation permits a person subjected
to abuse to receive unemployment insurance if she has left her job because of the
abuse. See id.
106. See id. at 26, 72 (discussing legislation in California and New Jersey).  In
California, legislation exempted persons subjected to abuse from paying nonresi-
dential tuition at state universities and community colleges, permitted them to ap-
ply for financial aid, and waived community college fees. See id. at 26.  In New
Jersey, new legislation requires the state to pay for any school tuition inured be-
cause a child is in a domestic violence shelter or transitional housing. See id. at 72.
107. See id. at 26, 40 (discussing amendments in California and Florida).  In
California, new legislation permits persons subjected to abuse to use CPOs as evi-
dence of domestic violence to terminate a tenancy due to the abuse. See id. at 26.
In Florida, legislation was passed providing relocation assistance for victims of sex-
ual battery. See id. at 40.
108. See id. at 44.  In Illinois, a new law permits a person subjected to stalking
and who obtained a no stalking order to receive crime victims’ compensation fund-
ing. See id.  This new law is notable because it does not require the person to be
subjected to physical violence.
109. See id. at 15–17 (showing ten states passed confidentiality laws in 2012).
For example, in New York, health insurers must honor requests by persons sub-
19
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violence.  Of the twenty-two pieces, only one piece of legislation, Oregon’s
legislation regarding teen dating violence programs, actually provides
money to implement the programs.  Three other laws, those dealing with
in-state tuition, waiver of tuition, and access to crime victims compensation
fund monies, provide access to resources or lower the cost of the re-
sources.  Accordingly, as seen above, the safety paradigm is the prominent
paradigm for legislation as well as funding of domestic violence responses.
One final nationwide program that exemplifies the safety paradigm is
the use of the lethality assessment screening program to evaluate women’s
risk of being killed because of domestic violence.110  Law enforcement of-
ficers use this program when they respond to 911 calls involving intimate
partner abuse.111  It is an eleven question instrument that is administered
by the officer and is designed to elicit responses by the woman.112  After
answering all of the questions, the police officer scores the woman’s risk of
lethality, and if high, contacts a hotline or shelter, recommending that the
woman speak to a counselor.113  Law enforcement officials do not give the
woman being screened a choice regarding whether to be screened or to
receive her score.114  If she is reluctant to speak to the counselor, law en-
forcement protocol instructs them to continue to persuade her to talk to
the counselor.115  In addition to law enforcement, the program is being
implemented by court clerks, judges, legal service providers, shelter prov-
iders, and other system actors to evaluate the severity of abuse and to de-
termine the level of services that should be provided to the woman.116
Importantly, the screening tool has yet to be validated.117  The program
started in Maryland and has been implemented in other jurisdictions.118
As of 2013, thirty jurisdictions are using the program.119
jected to abuse who want their health communications to be sent to a different
address. See id. at 74.  In Tennessee, new legislation exempts hospitals from having
to report injuries from intimate partner abuse to law enforcement. See id. at 84.
110. See generally Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4. R
111. See id. at 532–42.
112. See id. at 533, 535 n.73 (discussing questions and listing questions asked).
113. See id. at 536–37 (noting that, although police officers should only sug-
gest counselor at first, they are instructed to eventually “coerce” victim into
compliance).
114. See id. (discussing mandatory nature of protocol).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 539–42.
117. See id. at 558.  Researchers are currently studying the effectiveness of the
lethality assessment screen in Oklahoma. See, e.g., Jill T. Messing et al., Collaborat-
ing with Police Departments: Recruitment in the Oklahoma Lethality Assessment (OK-LA)
Study, 17 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (2011).
118. See Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 539–40; see also LAP: Na-
tionally, MD. NETWORK AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://mnadv.org/lethality/
lap-nationally/.  The creators of the Lethality Assessment Program offer training
and technical assistance pursuant to a cooperative agreement with the U.S. Office
on Violence Against Women.
119. See LAP: Nationally, supra note 118 (noting Alabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
20
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D. Evaluation of the Safety Paradigm
There is good reason to be concerned about the safety of persons
subjected to abuse.  Deprivations of liberty and dignity by assaults against a
person’s bodily integrity or emotional well-being are antithetical to the
values of a well-ordered society.  Accordingly, a view that recognizes the
crisis and danger of domestic violence is important.  The state is uniquely
well-situated to respond to an emergency or a crime related to the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens.  In addition, the network of heavily state-
funded, professionalized service providers that offer crisis hotlines, emer-
gency shelters, and legal services provide important options for persons
subjected to abuse to address any crisis moment of intimate partner abuse.
There are disadvantages to the safety paradigm, however.  Emergency-
driven measures designed to provide short-term physical protection ignore
the range of supports necessary for a woman’s long-term future.  Indeed,
some women who experience abuse may not be in physical danger, and
are therefore served poorly or not at all by the panoply of remedies de-
signed to provide physical protection.
A safety orientation also often impinges on women’s agency and dig-
nity.  For instance, there are many reasons why women subjected to abuse
do not take the course that the state deems the most safe—engaging the
state to intervene through the criminal justice system.  One reason is that
mandatory arrest policies can deter women from calling 911 to help with
the immediate situation because they may not want to subject their part-
ners to automatic arrest and prosecution.  For women of color, as Beth
Richie writes, such a decision is a recognition of the “Prison Nation” that is
at the intersection of race, gender, and domestic violence, where young
black men are incarcerated at alarmingly high rates as a result of a racist
penal system.120
Women also choose not to engage the state because, once they do,
their opinion as to what would be the safest option for them and what
would be the best outcome for them is often ignored.  Separating from
one’s partner who is abusive can be extremely dangerous.121  For some
women, they choose not to engage the state because they believe it to be
the safest course of action.  Research has shown that women are the best
predictors of future assault.122
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, North Car-
olina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington use program).
120. See BETH E. RICHIE, ARRESTED JUSTICE: BLACK WOMEN, VIOLENCE, AND
AMERICA’S PRISON NATION 46 (2012) (discussing how black women subjected to
abuse avoid involving formal legal channels so they are not seen as adding to ar-
rests of black men).
121. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 65–68 (1991) (defining “separation assault”); see
also LONG ET AL., supra note 53, at 2–3. R
122. See Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 558–61 (discussing re- R
search showing women are best predictors of their future risk of assault).
21
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Further, women do not engage the state because they do not want
their entire family to suffer the consequences of their partner’s arrest or
incarceration.123  Such actions could result in the loss of his job or the
ability to get future employment, diminishment of the family income, loss
of a partner in parenting the children, and loss of an intimate partner.124
Some of these women would prefer a way to end the abuse without ending
the relationship through the criminal justice system.125
Another reason women choose not to involve or cooperate with the
criminal justice system is because mandatory arrest policies make them less
safe.  Mandatory arrest laws became popular in the mid-1980s, upon the
release of the Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment (MDVE) study
that found arrests decreased the number of re-offenses of domestic vio-
lence.126  However, subsequent studies did not find the same results.127
The authors of the MDVE study showed that arrest might slightly decrease
the rate of re-offense for those offenders who are married or employed,
while increasing the rates of re-offense if the offender was unmarried or
unemployed.128  The studies also showed that if the offender had prior
assaults against his partner, or was drinking or using drugs at the time of
the abuse, he was more likely to reoffend regardless of whether he was
arrested.129  Therefore, arrest does not necessarily make persons sub-
jected to abuse safer.130  Nonetheless, the mandatory arrest laws remain
on the books and in practice based, in part, on the publicity around
MDVE and its conclusion that such laws decreased future abuse.131  More-
123. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 134–35 (explaining persons sub-
jected to abuse may avoid arrest because they fear trauma to their family, future
retaliatory abuse, economic impact, state discriminatory intervention against Afri-
can Americans, including removal of children and disproportionate use of force
and arrest against African Americans).
124. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 201–02, 228–29; see also LONG ET AL., supra
note 53, at 3.
125. See LONG ET AL., supra note 53, at 3.
126. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 2; see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 94–98 (describing Min-
neapolis Domestic Violence Experiment); Kohn, supra note 20, at 213.
127. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 98–104.
128. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 3; see also BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 100–02 (detailing Mil-
waukee, WI study showing that arrests deterred employed but not unemployed
offenders and discussing Miami, FL study showing that arrest coupled with prob-
lem-solving by trained staff with couple decreased re-offense rates for all but
unemployed).
129. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 2.
130. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 238 (explaining mandatory interventions in-
cluding mandatory arrest do not necessarily make individual subjected to abuse
safer).
131. In part, the prevalence of mandatory arrest laws continues because
VAWA required local and state agency applicants for grants to “certify that their
laws encouraged or mandated arrests for domestic violence offenders . . . .”
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 121–22. R
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over, mandatory arrest policies interfere with the ability of persons sub-
jected to abuse to make choices for themselves about how to address the
violence.132  This is a negative consequence because research shows that
when women subjected to abuse are permitted to make their own deci-
sions for how to address the violence, they identify greater life satisfaction
and reduced violence in their lives.133  Another negative outcome of
mandatory arrest is that police often arrest both parties when one party
might not have committed a crime.  For instance, one party may have as-
saulted the other in self-defense.134  Therefore, while having a criminal
justice system response to domestic violence is critical and necessary to
protect and support persons subjected to abuse,135 such a response also
needs to address the needs and desires of persons subjected to abuse.136
There are similar downsides to no-drop prosecution policies as to
mandatory arrest policies.  First, the prosecution will go forward against
the objections of the person subjected to abuse, despite the fact that it
might increase her risk of being subjected to further abuse.137  Second,
such policies result in fewer economic opportunities for the person being
prosecuted as well as the person subjected to abuse.138  Third, because
mandatory arrest policies often result in incarceration or no contact or-
ders, such policies disrupt the ability of the person subjected to abuse to
continue to maintain a relationship with the person who caused the
abuse.139  By granting the person subjected to abuse the power to drop
132. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 4.
133. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1125–27. But see UNIV. OF
KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 57, at 3 (citing
study showing vast majority of women identified mandatory arrest as benefit be-
cause it took responsibility away from women to pursue arrest).
134. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 3.
135. As Buzawa and Buzawa state, persons subjected to abuse “consistently
wanted the police to respond to incidents, even if arrest was not always desired.”
BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 139 (noting women wanted offender con-
trolled more often than arrested).
136. Data shows that given mandatory arrest policies, “police refuse[d] to fol-
low the victim’s request more frequently in domestic assault cases (25%) than
nondomestic assault cases (4%).  The victim disagreed with arrests made in 60% of
domestic assaults compared with only 12% of nondomestic assaults . . . .” Id. at
140.
137. See id. at 183. (describing study finding 50% of “victims reported that
their assailants had physically threatened them if they preceded further and at-
tempted court [proceedings] . . . .”).
138. See id. at 183–84 (citing victims’ fears of financial loss potentially in-
curred through participating in prosecution of assailant or resulting from assail-
ants’ incarceration or termination from employment).
139. See id. at 182 (citing research showing that victims chose not to cooperate
in prosecution because they are “far less concerned with deterrence as an esoteric
concept than with using the criminal justice system as a whole to accomplish per-
sonal goals of enhancing safety, maintaining economic viability, protecting chil-
23
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charges, the government would equip her with “the threat of continued
prosecution as a ‘victim power resource.’”140
Further, a criminal trial results in punishment that may provide no
meaningful remedy for the person subjected to abuse.  The defendant
may be incarcerated or fined, however, none of these outcomes provide
an immediate or tangible benefit for the person subjected to abuse, and in
fact, they can be harmful.141  The no-drop policy intentionally dehuman-
izes the person subjected to abuse and discounts her agency and dignity by
requiring the prosecutor to proceed against her will.142  Studies on no-
drop prosecution show that “enhancing the empowerment of the victim
[including permitting victims to drop charges], rather than the actual
prosecution, may be a key factor” in reducing re-abuse.143  Accordingly,
while it is important to have a criminal justice system available to prose-
cute domestic violence crimes, such prosecution, similar to the arrest deci-
sion, should be informed by and responsive to the needs and desires of
the person subjected to abuse.144
There are also similar positive and negative consequences to criminal
no contact orders.  If the person subjected to abuse wants the stay away
order, it can be a useful response to the violence.  However, once issued,
only the state can control whether the order is lifted prior to its expira-
tion.  A response that provides more control to the person subjected to
abuse would be a stay away or no contact order in the civil protective order
case, which should remain more in her control.
Other negative consequences of criminal no contact orders arise
when they are issued against the wishes of the person who was subjected to
the abuse at issue in the criminal case.  For instance, research shows that
criminal no contact orders do not stop future abuse and can harm wo-
dren, or having an opportunity to force participation in batterers’ counseling
programs”).
140. Id. at 201.
141. See UNIV. OF KY. CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra
note 57, at 4.
142. See BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 198 (“As one prosecutor ex-
plained, if the victim recants, the proper prosecution for domestic abuse cases is
similar to a homicide . . . .”).  Many scholars trace victims’ refusal to cooperate with
the prosecution to the Battered Women’s Syndrome and Learned Helplessness
theories as well because such theories reinforce the state’s idea that women sub-
jected to abuse are “passive [and] victimized” and should “not be seen as active
partners in domestic violence interventions.”  Kohn, supra note 20, at 208 (citing
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and
Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 561 (1992)); see also Fried-
man & McCormack, supra note 85, at 1188–89 (noting no-drop policies assume
that women subjected to abuse suffer from false consciousness regarding their risk
of danger).
143. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 34, at 202.
144. See id. at 201 (“[M]any women may be safer if they can freely drop ac-
tions but ultimately may be less safe if they do. . . .  [V]ictims need to be treated as
full partners in the prosecution of the case.”).
24
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men.145  As discussed in a model policy for courts and prosecutors regard-
ing no contact orders, “research has shown that, in some cases, a victim’s
separation from an abuser actually increases the risk of lethality.  The deci-
sion by the prosecutor or the court to restrict contact between a batterer
and his victim does not always achieve the system’s goal of victim protec-
tion and safety.”146  In addition, research shows that, because a mandatory
criminal no contact order issued against the will of the person subjected to
abuse is detrimental to her agency, it also negatively impacts her safety.147
Finally, criminal no contact orders issued against the will of a married vic-
tim create a sua sponte divorce of the spouses by the court.148
The civil protection order laws permit a person subjected to abuse to
obtain an injunction against the offender in the form of a stay away order,
no contact order, or some form of exclusion from the home.149  A positive
consequence of the CPO laws is that they can support the agency of per-
sons subjected to abuse: petitioners can choose to file the case, they
choose what acts of abuse to include in the petition, they choose what
remedy to select, and they choose for how long they will request the order
be in place.150  A negative consequence of the CPO laws is that they con-
strain the extent of the petitioner’s control, as they are often limited by
statute to a period of one year,151 and they do not cover all forms of
abuse.152  In addition, as discussed above, courts may intervene and un-
dermine the agency of persons subjected to abuse by ordering them to
separate from the person who has abused them, even if that was not the
relief requested.153  Further, courts may refuse to permit the person sub-
jected to abuse to dismiss her petition for a protective order, even if she
believes it is in her best interest to do so.154  Some studies have shown that
the CPO can be an effective tool in reducing domestic violence or achiev-
145. See id. 242–43 (showing criminal stay away orders issued against will of
person subjected to abuse do not prevent re-abuse); see also LONG ET AL., supra note
53, at 2.
146. LONG ET AL., supra note 53, at 2 (footnote omitted).
147. See Friedman, supra note 48, at 249 (citing Christine O’Connor, Note, R
Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV.
937, 962 (1999)).
148. See SUK, supra note 21, at 43–44.
149. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1131. R
150. See id. at 1128–29.
151. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 69, at 1085–88 (noting majority of state
CPO laws limit orders to one year, with several states permitting orders for two to
three years, and few states permitting them to last indefinitely); see also ABA
COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS
(CPOS) BY STATE (July 2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/domviol/docs/DV_CPO_Chart_8_2008.authcheckdam.pdf.
152. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1130–38.
153. See Goldfarb, supra note 74, at 1504–05.
154. See Kohn, supra note 20, at 225–34; Kuennen, supra note 20, at 52–53.
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ing the goals of the petitioner for the CPO.155  Other studies show that
CPOs are only effective for a segment of petitioners, similar to mandatory
arrest.156  Moreover, CPOs are most effective when they effectuate the
goals of the petitioner herself.157
The availability of emergency domestic violence shelters can be criti-
cal for persons subjected to abuse.  It is important to have housing availa-
ble for a person subjected to abuse who decides that she needs to leave
her home in order to address the abuse.  Shelters offer a necessary option
for persons experiencing abuse and trying to decide how best to address it.
In this way, shelters are the quintessential short-term remedy for physical
violence through physical separation and show how necessary certain op-
tions in this safety model can be.
However, as discussed above, there are limits to the benefits of the
shelter system’s operating model of total physical separation.  A 2001 study
shows that separation of the parties does not reduce partner homicide.158
In fact, some of the findings showed that resources focused on physical
separation can be incredibly dangerous to persons subjected to abuse.159
This dangerousness is due to the fact that focusing only on physical separa-
tion ignores the reality of the partners’ interconnected lives—sharing chil-
dren, property, friends, and communities—and, therefore, separation may
not be a true option.160  Further, the risk of violence may continue after
leaving the shelter.  In one study, almost half of all women experienced
continued domestic violence within a short time after leaving a shelter.161
Accordingly, the shelter model of total physical separation can be lethal
because separation may not be possible, safe, or desired at that particular
time.
Other aspects of the shelter system are also detrimental for persons
subjected to abuse.  The confidential nature of many shelters disconnects
persons subjected to abuse from their support networks.  While in the
shelter, women cannot disclose their location and are often unable to
maintain contact with the person who abused them.162  What research
155. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1128–29 (showing that R
CPOs are effective in decreasing future violence).
156. See Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 158–59 (2010) (explaining CPOs are less effective on
“men with prior criminal histories, men who are unemployed, and men who have
substance abuse problems” (footnotes omitted)).
157. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1124–29.
158. See Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 573. R
159. See id.
160. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 102.
161. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 44 (citing Cris M. Sullivan & Mau-
reen H. Rumptz, Adjustment and Needs of African-American Women Who Utilized a Do-
mestic Violence Shelter, 9 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 275, 281 (1994) (noting forty-six
percent of women experienced further domestic violence within ten weeks of leav-
ing the shelter)).
162. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 112.
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shows, however, is that because hidden shelters isolate women from their
community and the security that comes from being a part of a neighbor-
hood, women’s risk of experiencing violence increases.163  “As Professors
Epstein and Goodman explain, ‘research shows that women in hidden lo-
cations are no safer during their stay than women in open shelters where
community members can participate in keeping residents safe.’”164  The
negative effect of separation from a shelter stay was documented in a study
of Puerto Rican women, which found that the women “‘don’t want to
leave their community and come to a new place.  They may have language
problems.  They don’t drive.  They may never have paid bills or done a
budget. . . .  They’re not used to living collectively or sharing apartments
like white women do.’”165
Shelters often require that a resident be female, thereby excluding
men and transgendered women, resulting in fewer temporary homes for
persons subjected to abuse and fortifying a “worthy victim” stereotype.166
To rectify this gap in services, some advocates have suggested creating
shelters for men who experience intimate partner violence.167  Similarly,
anti-discrimination laws protecting transgendered persons have helped to
open up some shelters to transgendered women.168
Finally, it is problematic that shelters operating under the safety para-
digm are the party dictating the appropriate response to domestic vio-
lence rather than the person subjected to abuse.  One study has shown
that women subjected to abuse found services provided in a woman-cen-
tered manner that permitted the women to be the decision makers pro-
duced “‘good social support networks, fewer feelings of isolation, and
better access to childcare after receiving assistance.’”169  When services
were woman-centered, included active listening, and respected the wo-
man’s ability to make decisions, the services were most effective.170  The
least helpful were services that told the woman what to do in response to
the abuse and criticized her decisions.171
163. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 38.
164. Id. (quoting GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 102).
165. Id. at 38 n.159 (quoting SCHECHTER, supra note 41, at 59).
166. See Tara J. Palmatier, Domestic Violence Awareness Month: The Invisible Vic-
tims, A VOICE FOR MEN: HUMANIST COUNTER-THEORY (Oct. 1, 2013), http://www
.avoiceformen.com/mens-rights/activism/domestic-violence-awareness-month-the-
invisible-victims/ (stating that there is only one shelter for men subjected to do-
mestic violence, Valley Oasis Shelter in Antelope, CA).
167. See id.; see also Crick, supra note 84, at 1059 (discussing lack of services for
men in Washington State and proposals for addressing them).
168. See Goodmark, supra note 84, at 70–71.
169. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1126 (quoting Angela Moe
Wan, Battered Women in the Restraining Order Process: Observations in a Court Advocacy
Program, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 606, 611 (2000)).
170. See Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 572–73.
171. See id. at 572.
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As seen in the previous section, federal funding is heavily skewed to-
wards safety paradigm programs.  As a result, it is no surprise that the ma-
jority of state-legislated programs also focus on funding safety paradigm
programs.  It is important that violence against women is recognized by
the state and federal governments and that the responses to the abuse are
well-funded.  However, as seen in the above discussion, the funding of cer-
tain programs, such as mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, does
not necessarily effectively address the state’s interest in “safety;” as such,
programs may increase or have no effect on future abuse.  Moreover, in-
creased safety programs that override the choices of persons subjected to
abuse, such as the lethality assessment program, may cause significant
harm to women by decreasing their safety and negatively impacting their
dignity and agency.172
Mary’s story173 from the beginning of this Article demonstrates some
of the positive aspects of the safety paradigm while highlighting the very
problematic results of not having a security paradigm.  First, from Mary’s
story, we learn that only her physical abuse was recognized under the CPO
law and under the crime victims compensation fund (CVC), which pro-
vided the monies for the shelter, transportation vouchers, and food vouch-
ers.  As a result, the other forms of abuse to which she was subjected—
emotional, psychological, economic, and medical—were not recognized
or addressed by the court or the CVC officers.  Because of the physical
violence, however, she was able to gain emergency short-term relief based
on physical separation, which she desperately needed, such as emergency
shelter, emergency medical treatment, temporary transportation and food
vouchers, and a CPO for one year.  This relief is one of the great successes
of the current domestic violence movement.  As a result, Mary initially felt
“safe” through this court-ordered and community-based support for her
physical separation from her ex-partner.
But this almost textbook safety was not at all secure in the short- or
long-term.  As Mary recounted, yes she had left Todd, and she had an
order that said he could not harm her, but she had no job, no housing
after thirty days,174 no money for food after thirty days, no medicine, and
no clothes other than what she left the home wearing.  After her shelter
stay, she was left with no choice but to return to Todd.
The question raised by Mary’s experience is whether there is any
other way to construct the response to intimate partner abuse that can be
better at effectuating choices of women subjected to abuse to lead secure
lives.  This Article argues that the security paradigm offers such a
construction.
172. See generally id.
173. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text.
174. Similar to Mary’s experience, most shelters limit residents’ stays to thirty
days in length. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 43.
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III. TOWARDS A SECURITY PARADIGM
There is another paradigm to address domestic violence that main-
tains the benefits of the safety paradigm while mitigating its harms.  Pre-
mised on a broad, research-based understanding of “domestic violence” as
“intimate partner abuse,” this is the security paradigm.
A. The Security Paradigm
As reflected above, a “safety-at-all-costs” orientation impinges on wo-
men’s agency, dignity, and well-being in a way that may inadvertently and
counterintuitively make women less safe.  A different approach to address-
ing domestic violence would be to re-orient the system to prioritize wo-
men’s overall well-being, in addition to their physical safety, and to do so
in a women-centered manner, based on their views of what will increase
their well-being.
The security paradigm has four main components.  First, the security
paradigm recognizes all forms of intimate partner abuse, including physi-
cal, sexual, psychological, emotional, and economic abuse.  It recognizes
the coercive use of power and control in an intimate partner relationship
as key to the abuse.  In other words, the security paradigm recognizes ac-
tions that coercively constrain or aim to constrain an intimate partner’s
liberty, dignity, and agency.  Second, the security paradigm recognizes all
forms of harm that result from the range of abuse.  Therefore, the security
paradigm recognizes physical injury as well as psychological trauma, lack
of economic resources, and isolation.  Third, the security paradigm seeks
to create multiple options to address the abuse and harm.  These options
are both short-term responses focused on true physical safety as well as
short-term and long-term responses focused on economic, housing,
health, and relationship security.  Fourth, the person subjected to abuse
remains the decision maker in responding to all of the circumstances in
her life, including decisions in the context of the abuse she has exper-
ienced.  The state and other institutions’ role will be to help generate and
support options consistent with the security paradigm and help facilitate
her decision making.  To this end, the security paradigm recognizes the
range of motivations and goals she may have in addressing the abuse, in-
cluding the fact that ending the relationship may not be her goal and
addressing the abuse may be weighed against other important goals, such
as the economic security of her children.
Security can be accomplished by implementing measures designed to
promote women’s economic security, housing security, health security,
and relationship security, in addition to the physical safety of a woman
subjected to abuse.  For example, economic security would entail having a
steady full-time job with a reliable and livable income, reliable public ben-
efits, predictable and manageable living expenses, and the accumulation
of some assets, such as a home, a car, and some money in savings.  If she
does not have a job currently, economic security includes career counsel-
29
Johnson: Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: Fro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 30  5-MAR-15 8:45
174 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 145
ing, education, job training, and child care to assist the woman in ob-
taining job security.  Economic security would also entail access to
monetary damages and restitution for any and all harm resulting from the
abuse, as well as adequate family support if the woman lives separately
from her partner because of the abuse.
Economic security would also include eliminating and remedying em-
ployment discrimination against persons who have been subjected to
abuse.  When women subjected to abuse are unemployed because of the
abuse, unemployment benefits would provide economic security.
Economic security permits a woman subjected to abuse to make true
choices about how she wants to address the abuse in her relationship.
With economic security, she need not choose to stay in an abusive relation-
ship simply because her partner earns the family’s money and without him
she will not be able to keep her home or support her children.  With eco-
nomic security as well as job security, she may have more mental, emo-
tional, and physical strength to problem solve around the abuse in her
relationship.
Housing security is the ability to control one’s housing, whether it be
having a home titled in her name, being the mortgagor for a home, or
being the tenant in an apartment.  Such housing should be affordable and
stable, such that it can be on a long-term basis if that is what she wants.
Housing security would address and remedy any housing discrimination
resulting from the abuse.  Similarly, housing security includes, after abuse
occurs, the ability to decide whether to remain living in her home,
whether to vacate her partner from the home, and whether options for
short- and long-term affordable alternative housing are available if she
chooses to leave the home.  Housing security offers stability that has the
potential to reinforce her agency in determining how best to rearrange
her relationship to address satisfactorily the violence, while either ending
or continuing her relationship.
Similarly, health security means that a woman has access to adequate
medical and mental health care for herself and her dependents, including
regular preventive care, access to affordable medications, access to special-
ists when necessary, and transportation to and from appointments.175  A
woman who has these things can maintain her physical and mental health,
engage in typical activities of daily living, including self-care, and maintain
the independence, agency, and vitality required to satisfy her responsibili-
ties and contribute to the best of her abilities.
Relationship security is having relationships that are stable, healthy,
respectful, and supportive of each individual’s agency and dignity.  The
175. According to the United Nations Development Programme’s 1994
Human Development Report, health security includes “a primary health care ap-
proach, emphasizing community involvement, self-sufficiency and protection of
vulnerable groups such as pregnant women and the poor.”  William Aldis, Health
Security as a Public Health Concept: A Critical Analysis, 23 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 369,
373 (2008).
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relationships include relationships with intimate partners, children, other
family members, friends, and neighbors.  Relationship security includes
the ability to choose to stay in her community, connected to all supportive
aspects of her community, such as her place of worship, her neighbor-
hood and neighbors, and other social networks or resources.  Relationship
security acknowledges the importance of social capital, the interdepen-
dence of people, and the benefits of building and maintaining a social
network upon which she can rely for assistance as she continues to build
her future life.
B. Focusing on Security Will More Effectively Address All Types of Intimate
Partner Abuse and Their Harms
A focus on security looks at all well-being indicia for the person sub-
jected to abuse—her agency, dignity, liberty, and health.  A focus on secur-
ity can thereby take into account all types of intimate partner abuse, not
just physical, but also economic, emotional, and psychological abuse.  A
focus on security can generate options to address the broad spectrum of
coercive abuse while supporting a woman’s effort to obtain economic,
housing, health, and relational security.  For instance, as Dana Harrington
Conner describes, a woman may be targeted by her partner for economic
abuse because she is economically unstable, with limited income or no
home of her own.176  The security paradigm would foster and support
state, institutional, and community-based options—funded in part by state
money that is currently allocated to ineffective safety initiatives.  These
provisions would support empowerment-focused career counseling, while
also encouraging social capital creation through time banking.  This initia-
tive would also identify potential jobs and address obstacles to obtaining
employment, ranging from transportation to child care.
The security paradigm can look at policy through the lens of address-
ing and remedying the harms of intimate partner abuse and, specifically,
coercive control, as identified by the person subjected to abuse.  As such,
security permits us to focus on the varied actions taken or contemplated
by persons subjected to abuse to address the abuse rather than measures
taken on her behalf by others.  The actions taken by a person subjected to
abuse include her proactive and responsive deployment of the state, her
community, and local service providers as well as her decisions about her
relationships.  On the other hand, in the safety paradigm, a person sub-
jected to abuse has no choice regarding the mandatory arrest or prosecu-
tion following a 911 call and no control over a criminal no contact order
issued by the court.  Under the security paradigm, the person subjected to
abuse may choose to have the person committing the acts of abuse ar-
rested to stop the abuse in the instant and then decide she either does not
want him to be prosecuted or does not want a no-contact order to be is-
sued.  She may make these decisions for a myriad of reasons, perhaps be-
176. See Conner, supra note 36, at 359–60.
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cause she wants to continue living and managing her family together or
because the criminal justice system response will not meet any of her
goals.  In fact, the criminal justice system response may exacerbate
problems such as poverty or racial oppression through incarceration and
its effect on his economic livelihood.177
All types of intimate partner abuse can—and often do—affect the ec-
onomic life of the person experiencing the abuse.  For instance, domestic
violence is the leading cause of family homelessness.178  The cause of this
is as multifaceted as the abuse itself.  For instance, “[m]any abusers so iso-
late and demoralize their victims that the victims are left with few support
systems, and hence have great difficulty getting on their feet . . . .”179
Often, the woman experiencing abuse is economically dependent on her
abuser’s income, lacks access to other sufficient resources, and suffers
from decreased physical and mental health that negatively affects her abil-
ity to gain adequate employment.180  Also, if the abuser is separated from
the woman through the civil legal system, “his income often leaves with
him despite orders that he pay child support and maintenance.  Some wo-
men are reluctant to insist upon the payments because they believe that
they may be at greater risk of retaliation and violence if they make such
demands.”181  If the abuser is convicted and incarcerated for his abuse,
the criminal court has no jurisdiction to issue child or spousal support to
the woman who experienced the abuse.  During his incarceration, he is no
longer employed and earning an income to support her, and his future
employment is jeopardized with his criminal record.182  If he is an immi-
grant, his conviction can result in deportation, which further jeopardizes
his ability to offer financial support to her and their children.183  As a
result, the woman subjected to abuse may be in or on the edge of pov-
erty,184 and as mentioned above, at risk of becoming homeless.185  Fur-
ther, if she was isolated through the abuse, she may not have had access to
or sought out medical or mental health professionals to help her with the
177. See RICHIE, supra note 120, at 121–22 (explaining black women’s lack of
reliance on criminal legal system).
178. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 13; see also Preventing Domestic Violence
Survivors from Becoming Homeless, NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY,
http://www.nlchp.org/prevention (last visited Jan. 19, 2015).
179. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 156, at 160.
180. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1123; see also Aiken & Gold-
wasser, supra note 156, at 160 (noting women’s employment is often at great risk
because of abuse).
181. Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 156, at 160.
182. See Bailey, supra note 21, at 1794–96.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1794 (“A domestic violence victim faces a fifty percent chance
her income will fall below the poverty level if she leaves her batterer.”).
185. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1123; see also Aiken & Gold-
wasser, supra note 156, at 160 (noting women’s employment is often at great risk
because of abuse).
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol60/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 33  5-MAR-15 8:45
2015] FROM SAFETY TO SECURITY 177
abuse, any resulting depression, and other related issues.186  Instead, if she
turned to substance abuse to treat her mental health issues, any “substance
abuse issues may hinder the woman from being able to maintain full-time
work, provide adequate care for children, or seek appropriate services that
will assist in her recovery from the abuse.”187  Accordingly, focusing on
security is important to address all harms from all forms of abuse.
C. Focusing on Security Will Support the Agency, Dignity, and Resilience
of Persons Subjected to Abuse
A security focus more effectively addresses domestic violence because
it more comprehensively supports the agency and dignity of the person
subjected to abuse.188  Agency is making “choices, acts of resistance, self-
direction, and self-definition.”189  “Dignity is the inherent nature that ren-
ders human beings capable of autonomous action and thought.”190  Dig-
nity recognizes people as separate from the state, with the rights and
responsibilities to exercise their agency to address “ ‘fundamental ques-
tions touching the meaning and value of their own lives.’”191  To support
dignity, society must respect and support individuals’ capabilities such as
rationality; “life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and
thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; respect for other species;
play; and control over one’s environment.”192  Supporting one’s dignity is
an important endeavor because it is linked to the greater satisfaction and
happiness of the person subjected to abuse, even when she continues in a
relationship with her abuser.193  Security lets persons subjected to abuse
be an agent—to identify their own goals regarding the abusive relation-
ship and their life satisfaction and to make informed decisions to achieve
their goals without outsiders defining dangers and havens for them.
When we shift the frame to security from safety, we permit the goals of the
person subjected to abuse to drive the options that exist externally and
internally.  When these goals come into focus, we can see that they are
complex and multiple, driven by the woman’s whole life experience, not
just a decontextualized act of abuse.  Research shows that violence may
decrease when women subjected to abuse are able to connect to their
186. See Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 156, at 161–62.
187. Id. at 162.
188. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 16–17 (discussing importance of R
supporting agency and dignity to appropriately address domestic violence).
189. Margaret E. Johnson, “Avoiding Harm Otherwise”: Reframing Women Employ-
ees’ Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 743, 753 (2007)
(citing Abrams, supra note 5, at 111, 113). See generally Johnson, Redefining Harm,
supra note 5. R
190. Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 9–10. R
191. Id. at 10 (quoting Dworkin, supra note 4, at 426).
192. Id. at 11 (citing Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitle-
ments, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2008)).
193. See id. at 16–17.
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community, control their physical environment by leasing or owning their
own home, and build assets, such as home ownership or a small busi-
ness.194  And when persons subjected to abuse make their own informed
choices about physical separation or what is safe, they are more satisfied
with their life and less at risk of physical violence.195  Moreover, agency
fosters resilience, a necessary feature for addressing abuse in one’s life.
Researchers have shown that women who experience intimate part-
ner abuse often decrease their exposure to violence when they exercise
their own agency.196  As domestic violence is the systemic operation of
power and control, “ ‘[a]n important element of responding to the prob-
lem [of domestic violence] is to restore a victim’s fundamental rights of
freedom, choice and autonomy.’”197  For example, a woman exercises her
agency when she decides to obtain a civil protection order that will pro-
vide the specific relief she is seeking, perhaps in a form as simple as an
injunction against further abuse or as complicated as orders for child cus-
tody, child support, eviction of the abusive partner from the home, or an
injunction against any contact.198
On the other hand, when a landlord or employer requires a woman
subjected to abuse to obtain a CPO in order to avoid eviction or termina-
tion, the woman’s agency is constrained by seeking a CPO she would not
have otherwise sought.  In addition, a woman is unable to exercise her
complete agency when the court refuses to grant a civil protection order
unless the woman reluctantly requests an injunction against physical con-
tact.199  Such constraints on agency are not uncommon.  All agency is cir-
cumscribed by the context in which we live and the systemic operation of
power.  For a security paradigm focused on supporting women’s agency,
we should focus on supporting women’s exercise of agency that is most
linked to a decrease of intimate partner abuse: her complete agency that is
decided upon by her and that is countervailing to the systemic operation
194. See id.
195. Cf. supra notes 52–119 and accompanying text.
196. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 16–17.
197. Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1151 (second alteration in
original) (quoting Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic
Violence Victims: How Much Is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 30
(2007)).
198. See id. at 1131 (describing various remedies available under civil protec-
tion order statutes).
199. See id. at 1150.  Research shows that leaving an abusive relationship can
be more dangerous for women because it “may increase stalking, harassment, and
may decrease the woman’s ability to influence him.” Id. at 1127 (citing LENORE E.
A. WALKER, ABUSED WOMEN AND SURVIVOR THERAPY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE
PSYCHOTHERAPIST 55 (1994)).  Separation Assault, as it is known, results from the
abuser losing control over his victim and lashing out with increased violence. See
GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 97–98; Aiken & Goldwasser, supra note 156,
at 162.  Because separation assault is common, it is critical that the woman is the
one making the decision to exercise her agency in light of the abusive relationship
and her objectives, as she is in the best position to predict her risk of danger. See
Johnson, Balancing Liberty, supra note 4, at 558–61.
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of power, especially that of the domestic abuse.  Therefore, outsiders forc-
ing action by the woman, rather than permitting her to make the in-
formed choice about which action to take, can be counterproductive.
Institutional actors can promote and support women’s agency by ex-
panding options for women to choose in their efforts to address the inti-
mate partner abuse.200  One study explored the agency of low-income
Puerto Rican women who were living with abusive partners.201  The study
found that when the women decided to rent and control their own apart-
ments, they were able to decrease their exposure to violence.  The study
found that this decrease in violence occurred even when the women con-
tinued their relationships with the partners who had been abusive.202  An-
other study shows that women who received autonomy-respecting “support
and assistance” during a CPO proceeding “thought more positively about
the proceedings” and “reported having good social support networks,
fewer feelings of isolation, and better access to child care after receiving
assistance.”203  The options can—and should—include criminal justice
and civil legal system responses that provide physical separation for either
safety or punitive purposes.  But, to effectuate agency and thereby de-
crease future violence, the woman should be provided the opportunity to
make these decisions based upon her experience of the violence, her pre-
diction of the risk, and her determination of options that would increase
her life satisfaction.
The person subjected to abuse may not be able to achieve her goals if
she does not have real options—either because she has limited economic
resources or because our system has not chosen to fund other options
because they do not fit the “safety” paradigm.
Accordingly, a focus on security more effectively addresses intimate
partner abuse because it offers more avenues to address intimate partner
abuse, ensuring the economic, housing, health, and relationship security
of the woman subjected to abuse.  Further, I define security in this Article
as requiring that the person subjected to abuse, not the state or other
institution, is the decision maker as to which options to choose to best
address the abuse.204  Built into the security paradigm is a recognition of
the agency and dignity of the person subjected to abuse.
200. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1151.
201. See Sherri Lawson Clark et al., Housing Dependence and Intimate Relation-
ships in the Lives of Low-Income Puerto Rican Mothers, 32 J. FAM. ISSUES 369, 371–73
(2011).
202. See id. at 385 (“Mothers [ ] interpreted housing as a valued resource in
intimate partner relationships in divergent ways with independent housing being
seen as a bargaining tool to maintain or initiate relationships as well as a refuge for
terminating relationships that experienced conflict.”).
203. Wan, supra note 169, at 611.
204. See supra Part III.A.
35
Johnson: Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: Fro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 36  5-MAR-15 8:45
180 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 145
D. Focusing on Security Will Increase Access to Resources
A security-focused approach to address domestic violence emphasizes
increased access to economic, housing, health, relationship, and other re-
sources for persons subjected to intimate partner abuse.  As Dana Harring-
ton Conner discusses, “[f]inancial independence [for the person
subjected to abuse] shifts power within the intimate relationship.”205
Without such independence, one is vulnerable to a controlling or abusive
partner whether the person wants to remain in the relationship or leave
it.206  Jody Raphael documented that women on welfare experience inti-
mate partner abuse at four to five times the rate of all women.207  Donna
Coker analyzed a body of research showing the inextricable link between
access to economic resources and intimate partner abuse.  For instance,
Coker analyzed research conducted by Cris Sullivan, showing the connec-
tion between financial resources, future violence, and overall well-be-
ing.208  The study evaluated two groups of women who had been subjected
to abuse and were set to leave a shelter.  The control group received no
services upon leaving the shelter, while the other group of women was
provided with an advocate who assisted the women in accessing “educa-
tional resources, legal assistance, employment, services for their children,
housing, child care, transportation, financial assistance, health care, and
social supports.”209  These resources were provided in a woman-centered
manner based on the women’s individual goals, not state or institutional
goals.  As a result of this access to resources, the women experienced sig-
nificantly reduced psychological abuse, fewer mental health issues, greater
social capital, higher quality of life, and no physical abuse.210  These re-
sults were in stark contrast to the control group.211  Similarly, JoAnn
Miller and Amy Krull found that persons subjected to abuse who were
unemployed experienced greater rates of recurring abuse than those who
were employed.  Two other studies showed that the length of unemploy-
ment correlated with the rate at which abuse reoccurred.212  In addition, a
study by Amy Farmer and Jill Tiefenthaler showed that, as women’s in-
205. Conner, supra note 36, at 374.
206. See Coker, Economic Rights, supra note 9, at 188 (“Inadequate material
resources render women more vulnerable to violence.  Inadequate material re-
sources increase the batterers’ access to women who do try to separate.  Inade-
quate material resources are a primary reason why women do not try to
separate.”).
207. See JODY RAPHAEL, SAVING BERNICE: BATTERED WOMEN, WELFARE, AND POV-
ERTY 5 (2000) (analyzing overrepresentation of women subjected to abuse in popu-
lation of women receiving welfare).
208. See Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 24, at 1022–23.
209. Id. at 1022.
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come increases, the rate of domestic violence decreases, except for women
in the highest income bracket.213
Accordingly, the relative economic power within a relationship is cor-
related to occurrence of abuse.  Yet it is important to understand that
neither the woman nor the couple is an economically autonomous entity.
Both need to be viewed within the broader context of their friends, family,
neighbors, community, and society and the way in which they interact with
the larger system of economic dependencies and resources.214  In her ex-
amination of economic security of women subjected to abuse, Kameri
Christy-McMullin’s research shows that there are “six overlapping compo-
nents of economic security: public assistance, education, employment, in-
come, assets, and divorce and child custody settlements.”215  Accordingly,
this section examines the research regarding the relative economic power
within the relationship, including access to public benefits, education, em-
ployment, income, assets, and family law support, including civil protective
orders.
As discussed by Christy-McMullin, the first area of economic security
is public assistance.  There are multiple government assistance programs
that are intended to provide those in poverty with a safety net and security.
Unfortunately, as many have documented, the public safety net has shrunk
since the welfare reforms of 1996.  For instance, Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC) and placed a five-year cap on cash assistance.  TANF also
instituted work requirements, narrowed educational waivers, and nar-
rowed other waivers of the cap.216  As Michele Gilman documents, TANF
has not decreased the numbers of those experiencing poverty but rather
has “pushed many poor mothers into the low-wage workforce, where they
struggle to survive on meager wages.”217  Yet, even those who might bene-
fit from the minimal monthly average assistance of $429 do not receive the
assistance because of the bureaucratic and arbitrary gatekeeping of the
213. See Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra note 9, at 113 (citing Amy
Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence, 55 REV. SOC.
ECON. 337 (1997)).  Farmer and Tiefenthaler’s study also showed that violence
increased with an increase in the man’s income level. See id.; see also Kameri
Christy-McMullin, An Evidenced-Based Approach to a Theoretical Understanding of the
Relationship Between Economic Resources, Race/Ethnicity, and Woman Abuse, 3 J. EVI-
DENCE-BASED SOC. WORK 1, 23 (2006) [hereinafter Christy-McMullin, An Evidence-
Based Approach] (explaining that studies examining relationship between economic
resources and woman abuse provide mixed results, showing three recent studies
demonstrate significant relationship between economic resources and abuse, while
two older studies show no significant relationship).
214. See Coker, Shifting Power, supra note 24, at 1024. R
215. Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra note 9, at 111.
216. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 247, 249 (2014); see also id. at 254–56 (providing
helpful summary of TANF work requirements).
217. Id. at 249.
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TANF program and its workers.218  The net result is “4.5 million people
receive cash assistance through TANF (amounting to 0.47% of the federal
2012 budget) . . . .”219  As such, TANF is a very small public assistance
program, with capped spending at $16.5 billion.220
Moreover, although the numbers of people receiving TANF cash assis-
tance have decreased, “poverty and unemployment rates have in-
creased.”221  The unemployment rates for TANF recipients are explained
in part due to the higher number of barriers to work that TANF recipients
face, including “lack of education, mental or physical disabilities, sub-
stance abuse or alcoholism, limited work experience, and caregiving re-
sponsibilities for disabled children.”222  The poverty rates are explained in
part because “income gains from employment are often reduced by the
loss of public benefits and are eaten up by the very costs of working—child
care, transportation, uniforms, and other expenses.”223  Thus, even
healthy individuals experiencing poverty with some degree of higher edu-
cation and a work history experience difficulty gaining economic stabil-
ity.224  Additionally, the Supplemental Nutritional Aid to Families
Program (SNAP), otherwise known as food stamps, benefits 46 million
people.225  Even when families receive TANF and SNAP benefits, however,
most of those families remain below the poverty line.226  Further, single
mothers have a higher unemployment rate than in the past.227
The largest public assistance program is the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), which provides a tax credit for low-income working per-
sons.  In 2011, the EITC provided $58.6 billion to 26.2 million families,
helping millions rise out of poverty.228  To receive this assistance, however,
one must be employed.  There are other public assistance programs as
well, which are more fully-discussed below in Part IV.E.
The second area of economic security is education, as discussed by
Christy-McMullin.  Education serves as an important tool for increasing
opportunities for employment.229  Access to education can increase one’s
employment opportunities and thereby increase one’s economic re-
sources.  As part of the isolation that may result from the abuse, a woman
may not have been permitted to complete or pursue education that would
have enhanced her employment marketability.  For low-income women,
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 267.
221. Id. at 269.
222. Id. at 270.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 248, 268.
226. Id. at 268.
227. See id. at 269–70.
228. See id. at 267.
229. See Conner, supra note 36, at 386. R
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another barrier to education has been TANF regulations that permit only
30% of a state’s recipients to be exempted from the work requirements to
pursue education, and even that exemption is limited to vocational train-
ing or completion of high school.230  Christy-McMullin’s research shows
that having at least a four-year college degree has a positive impact on
physical abuse, while having only a high school diploma or some college
does not.231  It is important to note, however, that her research also shows
that education is not related to emotional abuse.232
The third and fourth areas documented by Christy-McMullin for eco-
nomic security are employment and income.  Not all employment leads to
economic security.  Rather, employment is integral to security when it pro-
vides a decent wage that raises the employee and her family above the
poverty line at a minimum, and provides the employee with job flexibility,
paid leave, and/or a chance for promotion.233  A broad range of long-
standing barriers to such employment exist, such as discrimination against
persons subjected to abuse, unequal pay between men and women, lack of
a broad-scale living wage for minimum wage workers, and gender segrega-
tion relegating women into part-time employment with few or no bene-
fits.234  Research also shows that employment is beneficial because
physical abuse is less prevalent in households with higher income.235
The fifth area of economic security is assets.  Studies show that assets
such as ownership of a home, real property, or a small business are impor-
tant aspects of a woman’s perception of economic security.236  Studies by
Deborah Page-Adams and Roger Peterson show that women who own
their own homes are less likely to experience intimate partner abuse than
women who rent.237  Moreover, when women controlled their assets like a
home, even if it was rented, they were able to have more satisfying intimate
relationships and decrease the rate of intimate partner abuse.238  Studies
also show that there is a significant relationship between asset ownership
and intimate partner abuse, and that the two are negatively correlated.
230. See 45 C.F.R. § 261.33 (2014); Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra
note 9, at 112.
231. See Kameri Christy-McMullin & Marcia A. Shobe, The Role of Economic Re-
sources and Human Capital with Woman Abuse, 6 J. POL’Y PRAC. 3, 17 (2007).
232. See id. at 18 (noting research is limited and that women’s level of income
may play large factor in issue as well).
233. See Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra note 9, at 112–13.
234. See Conner, supra note 36, at 383–86.
235. See Christy-McMullin & Shobe, supra note 231, at 17–18 (providing this
conclusion, but with caveat that significant relationship may not exist if race,
ethnicity, marital status, and age are accounted for).
236. See Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra note 9, at 113–14.
237. See id. at 114. But see Christy-McMullin & Shobe, supra note 231, at 18
(noting that, while their study supported this conclusion, it may be that female-
only asset owners may be at higher risk of physical abuse because male perpetra-
tors of abuse are not at risk of losing assets).
238. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 16–17 (citing Clark et al., supra note
201, at 385–88).
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Accordingly, women’s ownership of assets is correlated with reduced
abuse, whether the assets are homes, small businesses, savings accounts,
retirement accounts, pensions, or other personal property.239
The sixth area of economic security is family law support orders.
Many, though not all, civil protective order laws permit the petitioners to
request economic support for children and themselves, reimbursement
for expenses incurred due to the violence, control over the home, support
for the home, such as rent and utilities, and control over a car for trans-
portation.240  Divorce and child custody orders also include support or-
ders for children and spouses.  However, the current family and domestic
violence laws, as written and as applied, create obstacles to women’s eco-
nomic security.  For instance, although laws may permit emergency and
temporary custody and support orders, courts may not in fact schedule
hearings in a timely manner.241  Moreover, although divorce laws often
require the division and distribution of marital property in an equitable
manner, such equitable distribution may not in fact consider the eco-
nomic effects of domestic violence, including the effects of economic
abuse such as sabotaging education and employment opportunities and
the isolation that reduces access to employment networks and social sup-
port.242  Further, if the woman remains the primary caretaker, a 50/50
split of assets, coupled with child support, calculated pursuant to the
guidelines, does not adequately compensate the woman for the burden
that caretaking responsibilities place on the woman’s finances and em-
ployment opportunities.243
E. Supporting Relationship Security Enhances the Social Capital
of Persons Subjected to Abuse
Focusing on security reorients the framework for addressing domestic
violence from the danger/haven false dichotomy to an understanding that
the person subjected to abuse is someone who is at the center of a broad
web of relationships, connections, and support, composed of intimate and
familial relationships, community, employment, home and health; and
this web contributes to necessary security.  As discussed above, respect for
a woman’s agency and dignity, including support for the woman’s connec-
tion to her community, is critical for a successful response to domestic
violence.  Connections to the community help to develop and sustain her
resilience in addressing the intimate partner abuse in her life.  Because
abuse is systemic in nature, a person subjected to abuse will be more satis-
fied with her response to abuse if she can also employ a systemic response.
239. See Christy-McMullin, An Evidenced-Based Approach, supra note 213, at
23–25.
240. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 69, at 931–41, 990–1004.
241. This has been the experience of the student attorneys in my Family Law
Clinic.
242. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 8-205 (West 2014).
243. See Christy-McMullin, Designing Policies, supra note 9, at 114.
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As seen above in Part II.A., the coercive tactics of abuse include tactics of
isolation and economic abuse, which create greater dependence upon the
abuser and can hamper the ability of a woman subjected to abuse to
counter the detrimental financial and health effects of the abuse.  Re-
search has shown that for women experiencing intimate partner abuse,
their connection to their community is critical for their physical and psy-
chological well-being.244  The likelihood of future abuse diminishes with a
stronger network of supportive community for the woman subjected to
abuse.245  Critically, though, the community will best serve the woman
who has experienced intimate partner abuse if it is attuned to the woman’s
experience of abuse and her judgments regarding how to best respond to
the abuse.
Research shows that community connections are critical to family suc-
cess.  For instance, Carol Stack conducted an early study of survival strate-
gies in an urban African-American community.  Stack found that
“domestic functions are carried out for urban Blacks by clusters of kin who
do not necessarily live together . . . .”246  Rather, “the basis of these units is
the domestic cooperation of close adult females and the exchange of
goods and services between male and female kin.”247  The families ob-
served by Stack consisted of kin and non-kin who made up a small, organ-
ized, and stable network of persons who “interact[ed] daily,” “share[d]
reciprocal obligations,” and provided for the “domestic needs of children
and assuring their survival.”248  Stack’s study showed the “adaptive strate-
gies, resourcefulness, and resilience of urban families under conditions of
perpetual poverty or the stability of their kin networks.”249  These net-
works also engaged in “swapping” of items such as “food stamps, rent
money, a TV, hats, dice, a car, a nickel here, a cigarette there, food, milk,
grits, and children.”250
The reality that parenting and families exist within a web of support
has been shown to be vital to family success in current times as well.251
244. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 99.
245. See id. at 101.
246. CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COM-
MUNITY 9 (1974).
247. Id. (citing Carol Stack, The Kindred of Viola Jackson: Residence and Family
Organization of an Urban Black American Family, in AFRO-AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY:
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES (N.E. Whitten & John F. Szwed eds., 1970)).
248. Id. at 30–31.
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id. at 32.
251. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387 (2008) (discussing network of
caregivers that help support and aid parents and family unit). See generally CLARE
HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
14 (2014); Clare Huntington, Flourishing Families, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 273, 277–78
(2012) (arguing that family law should be more oriented toward establishing
strong, stable, and positive relationships to prevent family crises and, in cases of
family crises, intervene in order to preserve and repair relationships).
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Some options supporting the connection between women experiencing
abuse and their community currently receive some federal funding.  For
instance, open shelters—shelters which are situated in a residential com-
munity and are known to be shelters by the community—permit women
subjected to abuse to be in a neighborhood and be known by their neigh-
bors.252  Other shelters are located in confidential locations.  They do not
identify their purpose to people and entities in their proximity.  The wo-
men residents are not permitted to share the location of the shelter or
invite their family, friends, lawyers, or other service providers from outside
the shelter to the shelter.  Moreover, confidential shelters may be located
a great distance from the woman’s actual neighborhood and commu-
nity.253  Therefore, the shelter serves as an actual physical barrier between
the woman and her support network and community.  Research shows
that open shelters are just as safe as confidential shelters because, al-
though the location is known to the abusive person, the community acts
vigilantly on behalf of the woman.254  She is not as isolated as she would
be in the confidential shelter, and so her life satisfaction is increased.  By
focusing on security, we can develop and maintain other options to sup-
port the choice of the person subjected to abuse to remain connected with
her community.  For example, policies should respect a person’s decision
to avoid shelters and remain at her home in close proximity to her com-
munity support network of family, friends, and neighbors.  This network
could be critical to maintaining her employment, child care, and general
support.
In addition, the development of a woman’s social capital, “social rela-
tionships based on trust that have value or can be used productively,”255
can be instrumental in addressing domestic violence as well.256  While so-
cial capital is important for persons in all economic classes,257 it is essen-
tial for those experiencing poverty in order to access employment with a
living wage.  Moreover, persons subjected to abuse must build social capi-
tal across various institutions, communities, and individuals in order to
rise from poverty and address persistent abuse.  For welfare recipients, “so-
cial capital generated within closed networks of sharing relationships as
well as bridging capital that crosses class, race, and social boundaries”
252. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 102.
253. See id. at 102, 121–22.
254. See Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 38 (citing GOODMAN & EPSTEIN,
supra note 8, at 102).
255. JO ANNE SCHNEIDER, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND WELFARE REFORM: ORGANIZA-
TIONS, CONGREGATIONS, COMMUNITIES 9 (2006).
256. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 101; Conner, supra note 36, at
366–69.
257. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 321 (2001).
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helps “to create relationships of trust” that are instrumental for accessing
and maintaining critical resources.258
IV. PROPOSALS TOWARD SECURITY—THE LEGAL AND FUNDING LANDSCAPE
In this Part, I set forth a variety of legal, funding, and policy proposals
intended to promote women’s security.
A. Expand Actionable Harm in Civil Protection Order Laws
Focusing on security requires institutions to identify all forms of
abuse, including non-physical abuse and all forms of harm from the broad
range of abuse.  Civil protection order laws should be expanded to address
all forms of abuse.  Relief should be available to persons subjected to emo-
tional, psychological, and economic abuse, in addition to physical abuse.
Immigration law, divorce law, and public benefits law provide useful mod-
els, as each identifies domestic violence as physical and emotional cru-
elty.259  By expanding the forms of abuse that are actionable, the law will
address the actual experience of petitioners who have been subjected to
abuse and create further options for them to seek a court-ordered remedy
to address the abuse.
B. End Mandatory Responses
To effectuate security, jurisdictions should end all mandatory re-
sponses to domestic violence, such as laws and policies that mandate ar-
rest, “no-drop” prosecution policies, and criminal no contact orders
against the will of the person subjected to abuse.  As discussed above, the
research shows that women subjected to abuse are the best predictors of
their risk of future abuse.260  In addition, when women subjected to abuse
are able to make their own decisions about how to respond to the abuse,
they are more satisfied with the results—and the violence to which they
are subjected tends to decrease.261
C. Address Barriers to Employment
Economic security can be promoted for persons subjected to intimate
partner abuse by legislation that addresses barriers to employment and
provides exceptions to unemployment insurance for persons subjected to
abuse.  These laws need to define domestic violence broadly to include the
full range of abuse, giving women subjected to abuse full access to eco-
nomic security.  As discussed above, economic abuse can include sabotag-
ing one’s employment through a variety of tactics, such as constraining the
258. Michele Estrin Gilman, Jo Anne Schneider’ Social Capital and Welfare Re-
form: Organizations, Congregations, and Communities, 32 J. URB. AFF. 511, 511
(2010) (book review).
259. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1156–61. R
260. See supra notes 188–204 and accompanying text.
261. See id.
43
Johnson: Changing Course in the Anti-Domestic Violence Legal Movement: Fro
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\60-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 44  5-MAR-15 8:45
188 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60: p. 145
employee’s ability to leave for work in a timely fashion, sabotaging one’s
transportation to and from work, showing up at one’s place of work, and
contacting the employee at work to render her unable or seemingly una-
ble to perform her duties.  Moreover, the person subjected to abuse may
need to take leave in order to address the domestic violence, for matters
such as criminal or civil litigation that require multiple court appearances.
Similarly, up to one half of persons subjected to abuse report that they lost
their employment due to the abuse.262  Accordingly, legislation protecting
the employment of persons subjected to abuse is necessary.
Some states have passed such legislation, but all states need to do so.
As of 2013, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had laws in place to
protect employment rights of persons subjected to abuse.263  Nine states
prohibit discrimination or retaliation against an employee who was sub-
jected to domestic violence either because she was a subjected to abuse,
because there was disruption at the workplace related to the abuse, or
because she took time off from work to address the domestic violence.264
Three states have laws requiring the employer to offer workplace accom-
modations to the employee because of the abuse, such as relocation, flexi-
ble work schedule, and screening of incoming telephone calls.265
Further, ten states and the District of Columbia require employers to offer
some form of leave to employees subjected to abuse when necessary to
address the abuse, such as preparing to participate in court proceedings,
to receive medical treatment or counseling, to obtain safety planning re-
sources, and to secure housing assistance, relocation assistance, and legal
assistance.266  The states vary on the amount of leave, whether it is paid or
unpaid, and on the types of actions that will be eligible for the leave.267
Economic security would be greatly increased if each jurisdiction passed
similar legislation recognizing the employment rights of persons subjected
to abuse.
262. See JULIE GOLDSCHEID & ROBIN RUNGE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 3 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/domesticviolence/PublicDocuments/ABA_
CDV_Employ.authcheckdam.pdf (“Up to half of employed victims of domestic vio-
lence report that they lost their jobs due at least in part to the domestic
violence . . . .”).
263. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE—EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS FOR VIC-
TIMS OF DOMESTIC OR SEXUAL VIOLENCE (Aug. 13, 2013), available at http://www
.scribd.com/doc/160011402/State-Law-Guide-Employment-Rights-for-Victims-of-
Domestic-or-Sexual-Violence.
264. See id. at 1–9 (noting, as of 2013, states with some form of such legislation
are California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, and Rhode Island).
265. See id. (showing Hawaii, Illinois, and Oregon have some such form of
legislation).
266. See id. (noting states with some form of such legislation are Colorado,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, New
Mexico, Oregon, and Washington).
267. See id.
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In addition, federal legislation in the area of employment rights for
persons subjected to abuse needs to be passed.268  There have been major
legislative initiatives that have been introduced in Congress, but as of yet,
not passed.  For instance, Congress proposed the Security and Financial
Empowerment Act, which provides for workplace emergency leave, anti-
discrimination provisions, and reasonable accommodation provisions for
persons subjected to abuse.269  Congress also proposed the Healthy Fami-
lies Act, which provides for paid sick leave that can be used by persons
subjected to domestic abuse to pursue legal action and to obtain medical
attention, services, counseling, and relocation.270  In addition, the Healthy
Families Act precludes retaliation against the employee for taking such
leave.271  Such federal legislation needs to be passed to ensure economic
security.
To assist persons subjected to abuse in finding employment, pro-
grams should be offered that provide effective career counseling for such
persons.  One effective model of career counseling is based upon an em-
powerment model and is called Social Cognitive Career Theory
(SCCT).272  SCCT requires career counselors to “facilitate critical reflec-
tion and awareness of the power dynamics at work in battered women’s
lives; facilitate the recognition, enhancement, and use of the skills and
resources these women have; and, ultimately, facilitate the ability of these
women to contribute to the empowerment of others.”273  This model uses
Ellen Harley McWhirter’s empowerment theory, which defines empower-
ment as:
“[T]he process by which people, organizations, or groups who
are powerless or marginalized (a) become aware of the power
dynamics at work in their life context, (b) develop the skills and
capacity for gaining some reasonable control over their lives,
(c) which they exercise, (d) without infringing on the rights of
others, and (e) which coincides with actively supporting the em-
powerment of others in their community.”274
268. For a discussion of proposed federal legislation as well as other legal
responses to employment needs of persons subjected to abuse, see Robin R.
Runge, The Legal Response to the Employment Needs of Domestic Violence Victims: An Up-
date, 37 HUM. RTS. 13 (2010); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the
Workplace: The Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 674 (2008) (discussing trends in domestic violence laws).
269. See LEGAL MOMENTUM, supra note 263, at 14 (citing H.R. 1229, 113th
Cong. (2013)).
270. See id. at 14–15 (citing H.R. 1286/S. 631, 113th Cong. (2013)).
271. See id. at 15.
272. See Krista M. Chronister & Ellen Hawley McWhirter, Applying Social Cogni-
tive Career Theory to the Empowerment of Battered Women, 81 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 418,
422 (2003).
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting ELLEN HARLEY MCWHIRTER, COUNSELING FOR EMPOWERMENT
12 (1994)).
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Accordingly, SCCT uses the “five Cs of empowerment,”275 which include:
collaboration,276 context,277 competence,278 critical consciousness,279 and
community,280 in order to effectively assist women subjected to abuse in
identifying and obtaining their career goals.
D. Expand Eligibility for Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Reformers can promote the economic security of persons subjected to
abuse who lose their employment due to abuse by expanding eligibility for
unemployment insurance.281  At present, individuals cannot qualify for
unemployment insurance when they leave their job voluntarily, unless
they have “good cause” for leaving.282  In many states, personal reasons do
275. Id. (“Recommendations for empowering battered women and for devel-
oping interventions that address the variables and relationships defined by SCCT
are aligned with the five Cs of empowerment: collaboration, context, competence, criti-
cal consciousness, and community.”).
276. See id.  Collaboration is essential for effective career counseling because
it frames the process as the “mutual definition of the problems and construction of
goals as well as collaborative and flexible strategies for change.” Id.  As such, the
person subjected to abuse is identified as central to the counseling as it is her life
and goals at issue, while the counselor has an integral role in facilitating the coun-
seling. See id.
277. See id.  To be effective in the counseling, assumptions or generalizations
cannot guide the process.  Rather, it is “essential that the battered woman’s life
situation, including her educational and career concerns, be understood in con-
text.” Id.  Specifically, effective career counseling needs to account for her culture;
family structure; religious, community, economic and support network; law en-
forcement sensitivity; and local opportunities for employment and school. Id.
278. See id.  Chronister and McWhirter explain that effective career counsel-
ing requires the counselor and the woman to recognize “the skills, resources, and
experiences that women possess and that may contribute to achieving their coun-
seling goals as well as to developing new skills.” Id. (citation omitted).
279. See id.  Critical consciousness emphasizes the individual’s ability to ex-
amine herself within her life context and her ability. See id.  Specifically, this com-
ponent engages a power analysis for the woman to identify how she is and can be
transforming the identified power operating. See id.  It also serves to identify sup-
port for the woman in her community as well as obstacles.  The career counselor
also needs to engage in this reflection to ensure that her privilege does not under-
mine the woman’s work. Id. at 423.
280. See id.  Community serves many goals for career counseling.  Community
can be created through support groups or facilitated through similar interests or
existing connections.  This community can then “provide validation of roles and
identity; physical, emotional, and social support; and opportunities for belonging
and contribution.” Id.  In addition, the community can serve as a network for
school and job opportunities, development of specific skills, and development of
general skills required to be persuasive and equipped in oral advocacy. See id.
281. See generally Runge, supra note 268 (noting some states have amended
unemployment insurance statutes to include or exclude persons subjected to do-
mestic violence).
282. See NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR SURVIVORS
OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPANDING UI FOR WOMEN, LOW-WAGE & PART-TIME WORK-
ERS 2 (2003), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/8ffcd6de3f649a187f_b2m6bn78c
.pdf.
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not qualify as good cause.283  Some states have established a replicable
model, in which experiencing domestic violence can qualify as “good
cause” for leaving employment.284  Other states have recognized that peo-
ple who experience domestic violence may be unable to satisfy a require-
ment of being “able and available” to work.285  More than thirty
jurisdictions have passed laws that explicitly include domestic violence
within the definition of “good cause” or otherwise provide unemployment
insurance to domestic violence survivors.286  While the details of each law
vary, in most cases, the applicant must fulfill all other eligibility require-
ments for unemployment insurance, and often the applicant must provide
documentation or certification of the violence.287  In addition, under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the Worker, Home-
ownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009, grants were provided to
the states to extend unemployment insurance benefits to workers who
leave their jobs due to domestic violence, but those extended benefits en-




286. LEGAL MOMENTUM, STATE LAW GUIDE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENE-
FITS FOR DOMESTIC & SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS (June 2013), available at http://
www.legalmomentum.org/sites/default/files/reports/State%20Guide%20UI%20
Final%20June%202013.pdf (providing state-by-state analysis for all 50 states and
District of Columbia).
287. See id.  For additional resources concerning domestic violence and un-
employment insurance, see LEGAL MOMENTUM, ARRA: EXTENDING THE UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE SAFETY NET TO VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Oct. 2009),
available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/LegalMom_ARRA%20and%20UI.DV_
10-09.pdf; LEGAL MOMENTUM, TIPS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS SEEKING UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE (2006), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/sites/
default/files/reports/uitipsletterhead.pdf; Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault & Stalk-
ing: Unemployment Insurance If You Must Quit, LEGAL AID SOCIETY EMP’T L. CTR.,
https://las-elc.org/fact-sheets/domestic-violence-sexual-assault-stalking-unemploy-
ment-insurance-if-you-must-quit (last visited Jan. 22, 2015); Information Sheet: Ser-
vices for Victims of Domestic Violence Abuse, EMP’T DEV. DEP’T., STATE OF CAL. (July
2014), http://www.edd.ca.gov/pdf_pub_ctr/de8323.pdf; The Need to Leave Work:
Your Rights as a Domestic Violence Survivor, MASSLEGALHELP (Dec. 2012), http://www
.masslegalhelp.org/employment-unemployment/domestic-violence-time-off; Un-
employment Benefits for Domestic Violence Survivors: What Are Its Costs?, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (2005), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/UI/dvuicost2005.pdf; see also
L’Nayim A. Shuman-Austin, Comment, Is Leaving Work to Obtain Safety “Good Cause”
to Leave Employment?—Providing Unemployment Insurance to Victims of Domestic Violence
in Washington State, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 797, 827 (2000).
288. See Runge, supra note 268; see also American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 2003 (f)(3)(B)(i), 123 Stat. 115, 440–441 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 1103(f)(3)(B)(i) (2012)); Worker, Homeownership, and Busi-
ness Assistance Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-92, § 7, 123 Stat. 2984; 26 U.S.C.
§ 3004 note (2012), amended by American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-240, § 501, 126 Stat. 2313, 2344 (extending grants provided in American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and Worker, Homeownership, and Business
Assistance Act of 2009 that maintained unemployment benefits for persons sub-
jected to abuse until January 1, 2014).
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E. Increase Access to Public Benefits
Another way to increase income for women subjected to abuse is by
increasing their access to public benefits if they are income eligible.289
For instance, the TANF290 program provisions that permit persons sub-
jected to abuse to obtain TANF without increasing their risk of abuse
should be available to persons subjected to all forms of abuse, not simply
physical abuse.  Ordinarily, TANF has strict requirements for eligibility:
the individual must be employed and must be seeking child support where
applicable.291  Additionally, TANF has a five-year (or sixty-month) limit,
meaning that an individual may not receive TANF for more than sixty
months (whether consecutive or non-consecutive) total in her life.292  But
because domestic violence could increase if the TANF applicant were to
seek child support from her abuser, or if she reported to her worksite,
Congress passed the Family Violence Option (FVO), wherein the states are
allowed to waive any of the TANF requirements for persons subjected to
abuse.293  By adopting the FVO, a state certifies that it will screen to iden-
tify persons subjected to abuse while maintaining their confidentiality; will
refer them to supportive services; and will waive program requirements
such as time limits on the receipt of benefits, work requirements, or coop-
eration with child support enforcement if those requirements make it
more difficult to escape the violence or would unfairly penalize the per-
son.294  Notably, “[a]ll states have either formally certified adoption of the
FVO [forty-one states and the District of Columbia] or reported to the
federal government adoption of a comparable policy.”295  Additionally,
states are allowed to exempt 20% of their TANF caseload from the sixty-
month time limit for cases of “hardship,” including women who have been
289. Cf. Richard C. Fording & William D. Berry, The Historical Impact of Welfare
Programs on Poverty: Evidence from the American States, 35 POL. STUD. J. 37, 37 (2007)
(“Many analysts have maintained that public assistance expansion during this pe-
riod decreased poverty by raising the incomes of the poor (an income enhancement
effect), while others have contended that welfare expansion increased poverty by
discouraging the poor from working (a work disincentive effect).”).
290. TANF was established through the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESS-
NESS & POVERTY, SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS: THE FAMILY VIOLENCE OPTION FOR
TANF BENEFITS 4 (Dec. 2009), available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/NLCHP_
ShortchangingSurvivorsTheFVOptionForTANFbeneftis_12-2009.pdf [hereinafter
SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS].
291. See id. at 13.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 13–14; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF FAMILY
ASSISTANCE, TANF FINAL RULE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Apr. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/tanf-final-rule-executive-summa
ry.
294. See TIMOTHY CASEY ET AL., LEGAL MOMENTUM & NAT’L RES. CTR. ON DO-
MESTIC VIOLENCE, NOT ENOUGH: WHAT TANF OFFERS FAMILY VIOLENCE VICTIMS 2
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battered or subjected to extreme cruelty.296  Unfortunately, despite the
fact that the TANF waiver defines domestic violence broadly as “battered
or subjected to extreme cruelty,”297 TANF case workers interpret domestic
violence as physical violence, thus limiting who can gain access to the
TANF economic and other resources.298  For instance, in New York State,
waivers of TANF requirements are granted only where applicants can show
that they are currently in danger.299  This excludes persons who are sub-
jected to nonphysical abuse or who may not be in current danger because
the person committing the acts of abuse is incarcerated, for example.  Per-
sons subjected to abuse are also denied the waiver if they are unable to
comply with the monthly reevaluation requirement to remain qualified for
the FVO because of the other demands on their time from addressing the
intimate partner abuse.300  TANF has been shrinking and its effectiveness
in lifting persons out of poverty and providing economic security has de-
creased despite calls from advocates who recommend that TANF benefits
be increased.301
Additional provisions should be passed so that persons subjected to
abuse may access public benefits.  The EITC is the largest and most effec-
tive public assistance benefit available.302  Currently, under the EITC, mar-
296. See Rachel J. Gallagher, Welfare Reform’s Inadequate Implementation of the
Family Violence Option: Exploring the Dual Oppression of Poor Domestic Violence Victims,
19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 987, 1000–01 (2011); see also CASEY ET. AL.,
supra note 294.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(iii) (2012).  The definition of “battered or sub-
jected to extreme cruelty” is:
(I) physical acts that resulted in, or threatened to result in, physical in-
jury to the individual;
(II) sexual abuse;
(III) sexual activity involving a dependent child;
(IV) being forced as the caretaker relative of a dependent child to en-
gage in nonconsensual sexual acts or activities;
(V) threats of, or attempts at, physical or sexual abuse;
(VI) mental abuse; or
(VII) neglect or deprivation of medical care.
Id.
298. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 294, at 11–12; Gallagher, supra note 296, at
1002 (“There is, however, substantial evidence that TANF case workers often fail to
effectively screen for domestic violence and/or to offer waivers and service refer-
rals when appropriate.”); SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS, supra note 290, at 17
(describing screening process); see also Shelly Kintzel, Comment, The Effects of Do-
mestic Violence on Welfare Reform: An Assessment of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act as Applied to Battered Women, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 591,
592–94 (2002) (discussing how domestic violence cannot be limited to physical
abuse).
299. See SHORTCHANGING SURVIVORS, supra note 290, at 6–7.
300. See CASEY ET AL., supra note 294, at 12.
301. See id. at 16.
302. For additional tax resources for survivors of domestic violence, see gen-
erally NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 323 (Dec. 31,
2011), available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/TAS_arc
2011_execsummary.pdf; NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., TAX ISSUES FOR DOMESTIC VIO-
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ried couples who have lived together for at least six months of the last
taxable year must sign a joint return in order to be eligible for the
EITC.303  They cannot access the credit if they file “married filing sepa-
rately” (MFS).304  Accordingly, the EITC would be unavailable in a situa-
tion in which the person subjected to abuse is married and living with her
spouse but wishes to file separately to avoid further or future economic
abuse or coercion.  The EITC requirements should be modified to permit
the MFS status to receive the EITC benefit under these circumstances.
There are a few ways in which this could be accomplished.305  First, as
it did for a credit under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the IRS could
issue a Notice to permit the EITC to be available to persons subjected to
abuse who are unable or unwilling to file jointly because of the abuse.306
Under the ACA Notice, a married taxpayer may file MFS if she is living
apart at the time she files her tax return, she cannot file jointly because of
the abuse, and she describes the situation in her tax return.307  A similar
Notice could be issued for the EITC.  Further, towards more security, the
credit could be available even if the person subjected to abuse does not
live separate and apart from her spouse who is abusive.  One proposal for
this is to permit her to file MFS and indicate that she is filing separately
due to the abuse, is economically independent of her spouse, and requests
an independent credit.308  Another option is to permit her to file MFS
because of the abuse and then require the IRS to calculate the amount of
the credit based on each spouse’s separate filings, with the refund being
split between the spouses.
LENCE SURVIVORS: WHAT ADVOCATES NEED TO KNOW (2007), available at http://
www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/tax_issues_for_dv_survivors.pdf; Earned In-
come Tax Credit: A Vital Financial Tool for Survivors of Domestic Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., FAMILY & YOUTH SERV. BUREAU (Mar. 1, 2013), http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fysb/news/earned-income-20130301; Your Money Mat-
ters: Tax Information for Survivors of Domestic Abuse, IRS (May 2014), http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3865.pdf.
303. See SUSAN MORGENSTERN & MARY M. GILLUM, CONSUMER RTS. FOR DOMES-
TIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS INITIATIVE, FEDERAL TAX ADVOCACY FOR DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE SURVIVORS 5 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/domestic
_violence/intersection-tax-law02-24-2010.pdf.  There is an exception if one’s
spouse did not live in the home for the last six months of the year. See IRS, PUBLI-
CATION 596: EARNED INCOME CREDIT 5 (2014), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-pdf/p596.pdf.  If the spouse has not lived with the other spouse for six months
in the year, she may be able to file as head of household instead. See id.
304. See IRS, supra note 302, at 5.
305. Thanks to Fred Brown and Leslie Book for thinking through this prob-
lem with me and providing sound suggestions.
306. See Leslie Book, ACA and Victims of Domestic Abuse, PROCEDURALLY TAXING
(Apr. 3, 2014), www.procedurallytaxing.com/aca-and-victims-of-domestic-abuse/.
307. See id.
308. Thanks to Fred Brown for this idea, which I have simplified for purposes
of this discussion.
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F. Block Coerced Debt from Credit Reporting Agencies
As discussed in Part III above, access to assets is critical for security
because such access has a negative correlation to intimate partner abuse.
Accordingly, proposals that enhance the assets of a person subjected to
abuse will increase the likelihood of reduced exposure to future violence.
One way to increase assets is to increase one’s credit rating or address
negative credit ratings.  As Angela Littwin has documented, financial
abuse can be perpetrated by “coerced debt,” defined as “nonconsensual,
credit-related transactions . . . .”309  Debt can be coerced in multiple ways,
including taking credit cards out in a partner’s name, forcing a partner to
take loans, tricking a partner into signing a quitclaim deed to a home, and
excessively charging a partner’s credit cards.310  Coerced debt can destroy
a person’s credit rating,311 which, in turn, can limit the ability to rent an
apartment or take out a car loan, and can increase the interest rate on a
loan.312  By creating obstacles to obtaining housing, coerced debt im-
pinges on the security of a person subjected to abuse.313  Littwin proposes
blocking coerced debt from credit reporting agencies and having family
courts decide the parties’ responsibility for coerced debt.314  Littwin’s pro-
posal provides an initial step towards addressing the security of persons
subjected to abuse.  To further address these issues, community-based edu-
cational programs could be funded to address economic abuse and co-
erced debt, as well as various other ways to address them.
G. Allow Monetary Damages in Civil Protection Order Cases
All United States jurisdictions could include monetary damages in
their CPO laws for injuries to persons subjected to abuse, whether they be
physical, sexual, emotional, psychological, or economic.315  Only twenty-
two jurisdictions specifically permit restitution as a form of relief from do-
mestic violence.316  Compensatory damages are another area that should
309. Angela Littwin, Coerced Debt: The Role of Consumer Credit in Domestic Vio-
lence, 100 CAL. L. REV. 951, 954 (2012).
310. See id. at 986–91.  Misuse of one’s partner’s social security number to
take out loans or credit cards in that person’s name is another form of coerced
debt. See id. at 987.  Fortunately, a person subjected to abuse may request a new
social security number if they are being harassed, abused, or if their life is in dan-
ger. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., NEW NUMBERS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS (Sept.
2013), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10093.pdf.  This provision is a
good example of a security provision, as it defines domestic violence broadly to
include all forms of abuse.
311. See Littwin, supra note 309, at 1000–03.
312. See id. at 992–93, 1002.
313. See id. at 1002–03 (noting coerced debt often prevents women from leav-
ing abusive relationships).
314. See Angela Littwin, Escaping Battered Credit: A Proposal for Repairing Credit
Reports Damaged by Domestic Violence, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 363, 390–408 (2013).
315. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1155. R
316. See ABA COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 151 (noting states
with CPO remedy of restitution are Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illi-
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be expanded in CPO laws.  One effective approach to granting this rem-
edy is seen in those jurisdictions that permit “ ‘any other relief that would
address the domestic violence’. . . .”317  Such a “catch-all” remedy permits
persons subjected to abuse to identify how they have been harmed by the
abuse and to seek a remedy for their injuries.318  While forty jurisdictions
in the United States include a catch-all remedy in their CPO laws, they are
rarely, if ever, used for compensatory damages and full restitution.  To
ensure security for persons subjected to abuse, all jurisdictions should
both include a robust catch-all remedy in their CPO laws and use them to
award compensatory damages.
H. Increase Housing Options319
Further, all civil protective order laws should create viable short- and
long-term housing remedies that provide shelter and are sustained by gov-
ernment subsidy or by shifting the cost of the housing to the person who
perpetrated the abuse.320  Similarly, all jurisdictions should pass laws that
permit renters subjected to intimate partner abuse to maintain secure
housing options by evicting the person perpetrating the abuse, terminat-
ing her lease early if she wants to leave the shared rented home, and
changing the locks of a rented apartment.321
To increase housing security, certain steps could be taken.  First, as
discussed above, government money allocated to less effective safety para-
digm responses to domestic violence could be shifted to fund security par-
adigm options, such as low-barrier open shelters that have few treatment
or other requirements to maintain residency, transitional housing, and
long-term housing.322  CPO laws should not only allow the petitioner to
exclude the person committing the abuse, they should also allow the peti-
tioner to request that the respondent contribute to alternative housing for
the person subjected to abuse if she chooses to leave the home.323  Juris-
dictions could also provide rental assistance for an extended period of
time to support a person subjected to abuse who lives in alternative hous-
nois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana
(though it is unclear), Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oregon (limited to emergency monetary award), Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
West Virginia, Wyoming (only medical)).
317. See Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1155 (quoting Klein & Or-
loff, supra note 69, at 912–14).
318. See id.
319. See generally Johnson, Home, supra note 15, at 17–46 (providing full
discussion of housing options in context of domestic abuse).
320. See id. at 26.
321. See id. at 18–26.
322. See id. at 50–51.
323. See id. at 53 (discussing CPO laws in New Jersey and West Virginia that
permit petitioners to obtain funds for alternative housing from respondents, as
well as CPO laws in ten jurisdictions requiring respondents to provide alternative
housing to petitioners).
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ing.324  If, on the other hand, the CPO petitioner is able to vacate the
respondent from the home, CPO laws should afford petitioners the ability
to obtain a share of the household maintenance expenses from the re-
spondent to ensure that she can maintain the home.325  All jurisdictions
should have laws that permit persons subjected to abuse to terminate their
leases early if necessary to address the violence.326  Also, all jurisdictions
should have laws that prohibit discrimination in housing, rental or owned,
against persons subjected to abuse.327  Such laws will permit persons to
access and maintain stable housing.  All jurisdictions should have laws that
permit the person subjected to abuse to defend against a landlord’s evic-
tion action based on the domestic violence.328  Further, all jurisdictions
should have laws that permit renters subjected to abuse to require their
landlords to change the locks to protect against future domestic vio-
lence.329  Finally, all jurisdictions should permit a petitioner to seek a CPO
injunction against future abuse without requiring she stay away from or
not contact the respondent.330  When the person subjected to abuse
chooses to stay in the relationship that had been abusive, her decision
should be respected and accepted, to enhance her relationship, health,
and, here, her housing security.
I. Time Banking
Another way to increase the relationship security of a person sub-
jected to abuse is to create or recreate her connection to the community
and build her social capital.  One way to effectively build social capital and
connect a person subjected to abuse to her community is Time Banking
324. See id. (citing Alaska’s law providing rental assistance for thirty-six
months).
325. See id. at 26 (discussing CPO vacate provisions in New Jersey and Missouri
that require respondent to pay portion of rent or mortgage if excluded from
home).
326. Id. at 33 n.141 (citing rental laws in Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Wash-
ington, D.C., Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina,
Oregon, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin that permit persons subjected to abuse
to terminate their leases early).
327. See id. at 37 n.153 (citing anti-discrimination laws in Washington, D.C.,
Indiana, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Westchester County, New York that prohibit housing discrimination against per-
sons subjected to abuse).
328. See id. at 19–20.  Currently, only eleven jurisdictions have laws protecting
persons subjected to abuse from this variety of landlord action. See id. at 20 n.81
(noting Colorado, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
New Mexico, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin have such laws).
329. See id. at 19–20.  Currently, only ten states have laws that allow tenants to
change the locks on their apartments because of abuse. See id. at 20 n.88 (noting
that Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Washington, D.C. currently have laws to this effect).
330. See id. at 45 (citing Maryland’s law allowing petitioner to seek injunction
against future abuse without also requiring abuser to leave home or stop contact-
ing petitioner).
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and Co-Production.331  Time Banking is an economy that relies on peo-
ple’s work and giving time rather than money.  It is being used in over
twenty countries to meet people’s needs and deal with social problems—
such as childcare, mental illness, job training, social justice movements,
transportation, and drug treatment.332  Unlike the monetary economy, as
Professor Edgar Cahn explains, the invisible core economy that Time
Banking relies upon is made up of “family, neighborhood, community,
and civil society.”333
Time Banking uses human resources, where a person can give an
hour to someone else to perform such assistance as caring for a child or
tutoring someone, and that hour spent also creates a relationship.  As
Cahn explains, “[w]hen we give an hour to rebuild community, we are
building something we cannot buy.  Time Banking enables us to value that
and in doing so, we value ourselves, our time, our being.”334  When a per-
son gives an hour to another, the person earns one Time Dollar.335  The
person who is helped owes one Time Dollar and can pay it by helping
anyone.336  There is a database that identifies what persons in the commu-
nity are able and willing to do and when they can do it.337  A need for
assistance is matched using the database.338  This same system keeps track
of what a person is owed or has earned.339
Time Banking is beneficial not just because it provides the person
subjected to abuse with assistance but also because its reciprocal nature
allows her to feel as though she is connected and contributing to her com-
munity.  Research shows that acting more like friends is a healing and re-
storative venture.340  Co-Production is a construct that helps explain the
value and mechanics of Time Banking and the shared social justice goals
of respecting human beings.341
According to Cahn, social capital, “composed of trust, reciprocity, and
civic engagement,” is generated through Time Banking and Co-Produc-
331. See generally EDGAR S. CAHN, PRICELESS MONEY: BANKING TIME FOR CHANG-
ING TIMES (2006) [hereinafter CAHN, PRICELESS MONEY]; EDGAR S. CAHN, NO MORE
THROW-AWAY PEOPLE: THE CO-PRODUCTION IMPERATIVE (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
CAHN, NO MORE THROW-AWAY PEOPLE]; EDGAR CAHN & JONATHAN ROWE, TIME DOL-
LARS: THE NEW CURRENCY THAT ENABLES AMERICANS TO TURN THEIR HIDDEN RE-
SOURCE—TIME—INTO PERSONAL SECURITY & COMMUNITY RENEWAL (1992)
[hereinafter, CAHN & ROWE, TIME DOLLARS].
332. See CAHN, PRICELESS MONEY, supra note 331, at 6. See generally CAHN, NO
MORE THROW-AWAY PEOPLE, supra note 331; CAHN & ROWE, TIME DOLLARS, supra
note 331.
333. See CAHN, PRICELESS MONEY, supra note 331, at 1.
334. Id. at 4.





340. See CAHN & ROWE, TIME DOLLARS, supra note 331, at 86–87, 89–90.
341. See CAHN, NO MORE THROW-AWAY PEOPLE, supra note 331, at 29, 31.
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tion.342  These mechanisms could be a useful vehicle for persons sub-
jected to abuse who want to be connected to their community and also
have needs that their neighbors could help fulfill.343  In return, the per-
son subjected to abuse would also help others, in order to earn Time Dol-
lars for those owed.  The benefits would be the ability to address child
care, job training, and health care needs without money; identifying one’s
own capacity and abilities; feeling empowered by helping another and
making a difference; and gaining friends and a stronger, larger network.
Moreover, Time Banking is built around the idea that all people are
agents and have vast capabilities.  They are not problems or victims, but
rather solutions.344  People are not in need of charity or a hand out, but
rather can make their own change.  Such ideas are integral to a security
paradigm as well, making Time Banking a useful model for expanding
security options.345
J. Increase Utilization of Tort Law
Tort law is an underutilized potential vehicle for recovery of eco-
nomic damages for people subjected to abuse.  People subjected to
threatened or actual physical violence may recover damages for battery
and assault.346  A claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress347
may provide damages for emotional distress resulting from “extreme and
outrageous conduct.”348  In addition to common law tort claims, several
states and municipalities have laws that are specific to domestic and gen-
der-based violence.  For instance, in New Jersey and Washington, the “bat-
tered women’s syndrome” tort allows consideration of a pattern of
coercive behavior that constitutes intimate partner abuse.349  In New York
City, a woman subjected to abuse can file a claim based upon a gender-
342. Id. at 169.
343. Similar to the ideas of Time Banking and Co-Production, Carol Stack
studied and then documented how Urban Blacks in the 1960s survived despite
limited economic resources. See supra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
344. See Edgar Cahn, Audrey Jordan, Elvira Me´ndez & Sharon Lee Schwartz,
Human Rights and Time Banking, http://timebanks.org/wp-content/uploads/
2011/08/Human-Rights-and-TimeBanking.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).
345. Time Banking has been used by a project working with 5,000 women, as
discussed by Elvira Me´ndez and her co-authors. See id. at 2.  If the project’s screen-
ing showed domestic violence, then a group of men and women worked together
to respond to the situation in a supportive group environment focused on empow-
erment. See id.
346. See Camille Carey, Domestic Violence Torts: Righting a Civil Wrong, 62 U.
KAN. L. REV. 695, 696 (2014); see also Sarah M. Buel, Access to Meaningful Remedy:
Overcoming Doctrinal Obstacles in Tort Litigation Against Domestic Violence Offenders, 83
OR. L. REV. 945, 945 (2004); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 121, 133 (2001).
347. See Carey, supra note 346, at 696, 702–03 (discussing intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress).
348. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 (2011); see also Johnson, Redefining Harm, supra note 5, at 1158.
349. See Carey, supra note 346, at 709–12.
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based crime committed against her, while in Illinois and California, wo-
men can bring a tort action for gender-based violence.  This tort is based
on an actual or threatened battery or sexual assault.350  In addition, Cali-
fornia law recognizes a domestic violence tort that defines abuse as “ ‘in-
tentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or
placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious
bodily injury to himself or herself, or another.’”351
Thus, tort law provides a mechanism through which a woman sub-
jected to abuse may receive monetary damages for emotional and physical
harm resulting from physical abuse and may do so without engaging the
criminal justice system.352  Like criminal law, however, most cognizable
tort law claims prioritize physical violence,353 failing to provide a remedy
for other forms of abuse, such as emotional or economic abuse.354  Ex-
panding tort law remedies to permit damages for emotional or economic
abuse would be more effective in promoting women’s economic security.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a quotation from scholars in the area of cyber-
security.  They state that cybersecurity requires “organizational, legal, eco-
nomic, and social” aspects.355  In sum, because our national computer
network will never be “safe” from hackers, they argue, the goal of the sys-
tem should be one that is secure because it is resilient and can withstand,
recover, and be strong in the face of breaches of security.356  Similarly, our
legal system and funding schemes could benefit from focusing on support-
ing the resiliency of persons subjected to abuse—what I call security—
which encompasses organizational, legal, economic, and social aspects
that help the person subjected to abuse fortify her liberty, dignity, and
agency.
Current domestic violence policy, with its limited goal of safety—pri-
marily focused on short-term physical separation to decrease physical inti-
mate partner violence—is both too broad and too narrow a goal.  It is too
broad a goal because actions taken against the will of the woman subjected
to abuse may actually increase her risk of abuse rather than make her safe.
In addition, physical separation can also increase abuse.  On the other
hand, it is too narrow a goal, because the safety paradigm fails to recognize
and respond to all forms of domestic abuse, all forms of harm from such
abuse, other responses that are not focused merely on short-term physical
350. See id. at 715–16.
351. Id. at 716 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700(a) (West 2005)).
352. See id. at 735–53.
353. Carey states that most successful intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress claims were based on actual or threatened physical abuse. See id. at 702.
354. See id. at 754–55.
355. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 36. R
356. See id.
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separation, and the decision making capabilities of the woman subjected
to abuse.
Instead, this Article argues for domestic violence policy, which shapes
the civil legal system and government funding criteria, to focus on secur-
ity.  Security incorporates all forms of abuse, including physical, sexual,
emotional, psychological, and economic; focuses on all harms that result
from these varying forms of abuse; identifies short- and long-term re-
sponses that enhance the economic, housing, health, and relationship se-
curity of the person subjected to abuse because of the connection between
such security and the decrease of domestic violence; and ensures that the
person subjected to the abuse is the decision maker as to the appropriate
responses to the abuse, because her agency and dignity have a positive
relationship to her satisfaction with her life and the recurrence of domes-
tic violence.
As stated earlier, the domestic violence movement is at a choice mo-
ment where changing from a safety paradigm to a security paradigm could
be beneficial to persons subjected to abuse.  A security paradigm could be
more effective in identifying and remedying all forms of abuse and the
harms from abuse, as well as achieving the goals of addressing intimate
partner violence, because the domestic violence legal, policy, and funding
systems would address domestic violence in the way that the person sub-
jected to domestic violence would like to address it.  Such goals, weighed
in the context of her other goals—such as continuing her relationship,
achieving economic stability, evaluating her safety, and protecting her
children—may result in her choosing to eliminate, to decrease, or to toler-
ate a measure of the domestic violence.  A shift from safety to security
would provide state and institutional short- and long-term options to bet-
ter address all forms of intimate partner abuse beyond physical violence;
better address all harms of intimate partner abuse; and enhance effective
responses to intimate partner abuse by supporting the agency of persons
subjected to abuse, by supporting their community connections and in-
creasing their social capital, and by increasing their access to economic,
housing, and health resources.
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